The supply response to exchange rate reform in sub-Saharan Africa (empirical evidence) by Rouis, Mustapha et al.
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  13  -11
The  Supply  Response  Exp~~~~~~~~0ansionary  monetar  policy
leads  to  ap~preciation  of the
to  Exchange  Rate  Reform  real exchangert  o  2Sb
Saharan  African  countnies.
in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  ~uto~  ea
effective  policy  too]  to.correct
(Empirical Evidence)  anoevle  urrency,  i
*accompanied'by  restrictive




Africa  Regonal Office


















































































































POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  1311
Summary findings
In the diversity of exchange-rate  regimes in Sub-Saharan  policy, external  budgetary and  balance-of-payments
Africa in the  I980s,  there was a trend coward morc  support,  and  official commitment  ro a credible  reform
flexible resimes and smaller parallel  markets.  How  process-
particular  exchange  rate arrangements  affect such factors  In the face of significant adverse real shocks
as output  supply cannot  be dctermined  for Sub-Saharan  (internal  and external),  built-in monetary  and  fiscal rules
African countries  on the basis of experience  in other  in fixed exchange  rate regimes with currency
developing  countries,  because Sub-Saharan  countries  convertibility  (as in the CFA zone)  may bh inadequate  to
differ  in the composition  of their  exports  and imports,  in  bring about  the required  shorr-term  adjusrmenr.
level of industrialization,  and  in development  of the  *  As elsewhere  in the developing  world, the  effect of
financial sector.  real devaluation  on output  in Sub-Saharan Africa is
Rouis, Razzak, and Mollinedo  supplement  a survey of  mixed in the short-run  (contractionary  when  demand
the literature  witih empirical testing, using pooled  time-  elasticities are low) and  ncutral in the  long-run.  Real
scries and cross-section data for 22 countries  in Sub-  depreciations  have neutral  effects on per capira growth
Saharan Africa for 1971-91.  Among their  findings:  of real output  in the transition  to steady state..
*  When  macroeconomic  policies are inconsistent  and  *  Farm producers  in Sub-Saharan Africa respond to
there  is a failure to adjust to adverse shocks, fixed  price incentives for a single agricultural  crop as farmers
regimes lead to overvaluation  and  rhe developmenr  of  do elsewhere  in the developing  world-  hey  tbehave
widespread  parallel  markets for foreign exchange.  rationally.  And econometric  evidenoe confirms that
- *  Sub-Saharan  African countries  have attempted  growth  in agricuirural exports  is nor achieved at the
exchange-rare  unification  through  occasional  expense  of food production.
devaluations,  a crawling peg, official dual markets,  - Applying the Granger-causality test to this data set
foreign exchange  auctions, and  a market  pricing rule.  reveals strong  causality, running  in both directions,
Most such experiernces have bcen gradual,  and  their  between  money growth  rates and  inflation.  It also shows
outcomes  mixed. Success in exchange-rate  unification  (as  causality running  from  output to inflation,  and  from
experience  in Ghana and  Uganda shows) depends on  inflation  to nominal devaluations.
three  crucial elements:  supportive  monetary  and  fiscal
This paper-a  product of the Africa  Regional Office, Office of the Chief Economist-  is part of a larger effort in the department
region to bettcr understand rhe supply rcsponse to cxchange rate rcform in Sub-Saharan Africa. Copics of the paper are available
free from the World Bank, 1818 H StrcerNW, Washington, DC 20433. Please conractJocelyn Schwartz, room JS-255, extension
32250 (85 pages).  June  1994.
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development  issues.  An objectiveofthesries  is toget the findings  out quickly,  even if the presentations  are  less  than  filly polished The
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Summary Findings
Empirical research into key exchange rate issues in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is limited when
compared with that in developing  countries as a whole. Further, SSA countries  possess significant
differences from other developing countries in such structural features as the composition of
imports and exports, the level of industrialization  and the development of the financial sector.
Consequently, the pros and cons of particular exchange rate arrangements for such issues as
output supply, are not conclusively  established from the experience of other developing areas.
Two issues are targeted in this paper. First, SSA countries are distinguished in terms of
the exchange  rate regimes they have adopted, and the achievement  of objectives  of exchange  rate
policy is contrasted across countries. Second, the output supply response of real devaluations in
developing countries as a whole is reviewed; then the analysis focuses on SSA countries, with
special attention given to the supply response in agriculture.
The review of the literature is supplemented  by empiricai testing. We used pooled time-
series and cross-section  data for 22 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa for the period 1971-1991  to
address the following questions: the dynamic relationship  between nominal and real devaluations,
the  impact of  real devaluations on  per capita income, and the causal relationships and the
direction of causality between devaluations, inflation, income and exports.
Exchange Rate Regimes
Our review indicates  that there has Deen  a wide diversity of exchange  rate regimes in Sub-Saharan
Africa during the 1980s, with the trend towards more flexible regimes and a reduction in the size
of parallel  markets. The lessons drawn from the SSA -experience concerning the choice of
exchange rate arrangement are the following:
*  When macro economic policies are inconsistent  and there is failure to adjust to adverse
macroeconomic shocks, fixed regimes lead to overvaluation and the development of
widespread  parallel markets for foreign exchange. Through their negative macro-effects
this in turn leads to inflation, instability and decline in output growth.
- *  The exchange rate unification has been attempted by SSA countries through several
means: occasional devaluations, a crawling peg, official dual markets, foreign exchange
auctions, and a market pricing rule. Most exchange  rate unification  experiences  have been
gradual and their outcomes  have been mixed. Country experiences  show that the success
in exchange rate unification (the case of Ghana and Uganda) depends on three crucial
elements: supportive monetary and fiscal policy,  external budgetary and balance of
payments support, and a credible reform process to which the authorities are committed.
*  In  the presence of  significant adverse real  shocks  (internal and  external), built-in
monetary and fiscal rules in fixed exchange rate regimes with currency convertibility
(e.g. CFA zone) may not be adequate  to bring about  the required adjustment  in the short-
run...
Exchange Rate Reforms and Supply Response
Many SSA countries outside the CFA zone have undertaken substantial real depreciations during
the 1980s  and the early 1990s. In January 1994, the CFA zone countries changed the CFA franc
parity from 50 to  100 per French franc, the first such an adjustment since the establishment.  of
the zone in 1948. The objective was to reestablish the zone's competitiveness  which has eroded
significantly over the years, particularly since the mid-1980s. With the exception  of this recent
development which is not covered in this paper, the evidence of the supply impact of  real
devaluations in SSA countries reviewed here are summarized  below..
Aggregate Output Supply
*  As in the rest of the developing world, the effect of real devaluation on output in Sub-
Saharan Africa is mixed in the short run (contractionary when demand elasticities are
low) and neutral in the long run. This finding is supported by our own empirical analysis
which is based on  a growth model with real depreciations of  exchange rates as  an
additional argument. The model shows that real depreciations  have neutral effects on per
capita growth of real output in the transition to steady-state.
Agricdturlrd  Supply
- - *  In the case of a single agricultural crop, the evidence  shows that farm producers in SSA
respond to  price incentives as any other farmers in the developing world.  In other
words, African farmers behave rationally.
*  The  evidence also  shows that  in  Sub-Saharan Africa aggregate agriculture supply
elasticities with respect to price incentives, including real exchange rate depreciation, are
positive and comparable to that in other parts of the developing world.
*  The possibility that agricultural exports may crowd out food production was examined.
Econometric evidence confirms  that the growth in agricultural exports is not achieved at
the expense of food production.  Food production is positively correlated with export
crop prices and real exchange rates, suggesting complementarity.
Export Supply  and  Sinultaneous  Expansion
A number of empirical studies confirm the response of real exports to changes in the real
exchange rates in Sub-Saharan  Africa (see for instance Balassa and Dorosh).  Balassa in
particular found that a 1 percent change in the real exchange rate is associated with 0.8
to  1 percent change in the ratio of exports to  output.  Our empirical testing of the
Granger-causality model shows that there is no significant causal relationship between
real  exports  growth rates  and real  depreciations. This  result should,  however,  be
interpreted with caution as fiscal policies are not controlled for in the model.
*  Simultaneous devaluations by several SSA countries is unlikely to  reduce their total
export earnings with the  possible exception of  cocoa exports.  Thus  the  "fallacy
composition" argument, or the "adding-up" problem, does not seem to apply to African
commodity  exports, except for cocoa.iii
Inflationary Consequences
Our empirical testing shows that there  is contemporaneous and long run significant
relationship-  between nominal and real devaluations.  We find a  10 percent  -nominal
devaluation to have 7.7 percent real effects in the long run.  This confirms that nominal
devaluation can  indeed be  an  effective tool to  correct an  overvalued currency  if
accompanied by restrictive monetary and fiscal policies.
:  *  Applying the Granger-causality  test to our data set, we find strong causality, running in
both direction, between money growth rates and intlation.  We also find a causality
running from output to inflation, and from inflation to nominal devaluations.I
Introduction
Research on exchange rate policy and its impact in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has been fairly
limited until recently. Up until the early 1980s, the majority  of SSA countries had fixed exchange
rate regimes. Apart from the CFA zone countries, which combine a peg to the French franc with
full currency convertibility, most SSA countries had closed trade and capital accounts, and hence
provided incentives for the emergence of parallel markets in foreign exchange. Following the
adverse ternis of track shocks in the mid-1970s, and the tightening  of controls in these countries,
parallel markets expanded rapidly, becoming major markets in the macroeconomy. During the
1980s, with the emphasis on unification of official and parallel exchange rates, or  at least a
significant reduction in the size and importance  of parallel markets, a wide diversity of exchange
rate arrangements arose. In the context of structural adjustment  programs, a broad range of initial
conditions, macro-policy measures and exogenous shocks have resulted in a similar diversity of
outcomes for unification. Research in the area has consequently  been stimulated, and the World
Bank has recently launched several large cross-country studies in this direction.  y
This paper examines the diversity of exchange rate arrangements undertaken in  SSA
during  the  1980s, provides stylized facts and  considers the  relative merits of the different
regimes. In particular, the successes  and failures of exchange rate unification by adopting a more
flexible exchange rate regime are evaluated  for countries with closed capital and possibly current
accounts, and substantial black markets. Lessons from the CFA zone countries are discussed with
reference to recent empirical studies.
The paper also addresses a number of key exchange rate issues for SSA countries. First,
the output supply response  -to real devaluation in developing countries as a whole is reviewed.
The paper shows how various structural features, such as the composition  of exports and imports,
and the level of industrialization, distinguish SSA countries from other developing countries.
Then the analysis  focuses specifically  on SSA countries, with special attention given to the supply
response in agriculture. Finally, in addition to the review of the literature on exchange  rate policy
1/ These include "Exchange  Rate Regimcs  in Africa" (Pinto, 1989); "Macroecononmic  Aspects of Foreign Exchange
Markets in Developing Countries: Multiple Markets and  Black Markets'  (Kiguel and O'Connell,  1992); "Real
Exchange Rate (RER) management  in the Communauti Financiere Africaine (CFA) franc zone" (*); and "Foreign
exchange auction markcts and exchange  rate unification in Sub-Saharan  Africa" (Aron and Elbadawi, 1993).2
in SSA, the paper addresses three empirical questions using pooled time-series and cross-section
data for 22 SSA economies for the period 1971-91. These are the dynamic relationship  between
nominal and real devaluations, the impact of real devaluations  on per capita real GOP growth,
and the causal relationships and the directions of causality  between devaluations, inflation, GDP
growth and exports.
It should be highlighted  here that the real exchange rate is an endogenous variable and
that nominal devaluation is just one of the instruments that affect its level.  Nominal devaluations
do not always result -in  a change in the real exchange rate.  The magnitude of such as change
depends on the type of fiscal, monetary and income policies that accompany the devaluation.
The paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the evolution of exchange rate
arrangements  undertaken in SSA, examines  the successes  and failures  of exchange rate unification-
in adjusting countries without currency convertibility, and discusses the experience of the CFA
zone countries in the 1970s  and 1980s. Chapter 3 reviews existing literature on the effectiveness
of output supply response of a real devaluation. And chapter 4 tests empirically the impact of real
exchange  rate devaluations  on economic  growth and exports and analyses  the relationship  between
nominal and real devaluations.3-
2
Exchange Rate Arrangements
A wide diversity of exchange rate regimes is present today in Sub-Saharan  Africa. However, until
the mid-197Os exchange rate  policy had  played  a  negligible role  in  balance of  payments
adjustments in SSA countries, and most SSA countries employed fixed exchange rate regimes,
-These regimes appeared viable in the context of a relatively favorable external environment.
However, witi the severe oil and commodities  market shocks of the mid-1970s, foreign exchange
reserves were drained, bringing the fixed rate regimes under pressure. These pressures were
exacerbated by  a slow fiscal adjustment in the recessionary circumstances. In most cases the
response was  to  defend the overvalued fixed rates by  rationing foreign exchange through
imnposing  or  tightening exchange and trade  conwols. The  emergence and subsequent rapid
expansion of black markets for foreign exchange had their origin in these controls.
At least until the mid-1980s black markets were widespread in SSA. The extent of illegal
or quasi-legal  black markets in the SSA region is shown in Table 1. Relative to other developing
regions (notably Latin America), the parallel markets in SSA countries have tended to be large
and thriving markets, with substantial spreads (pr2mia) between the official and black rates
(Kiguel and O'Connell,  1992). The size of the black market premia for  a number of  SSA
countries over the periods 1974-80, 1981-86  and 1990-91 is shown in Table 2.
There is a large literature concerning the determinants of these spreads or premia (e.g.
Agenor, 1992; Lizondo, 1990). In standard models, expectations  and portfolio considerations are
likely to be important determinants in the shor-run.  The long-run steady state premium depends
on macro-fundamentals  such as the terms of trade, the budget deficit, capital flows and the trade
regime. Thus,  the prevalence of black markets in SSA have been attributed to  inconsistent
policies and failure to  adjust to adverse macroeconomic shocks, current account deficits, and
extreme overvaluation of exchange rates; and the markets have tended to expand during periods
of expansive macro-policies (Kiguel and O'Connell,  1992). Several empirical studies on SSA
countries have found support for the theoretical determinants  of the premium and have shown itsTable  1: Multiple Foreign Exchange Markets  in Sub-Saharan  Africa.
COUmN7Y  PA  YMEN7  RESI7UCn7ONS  NATURE  OF  FREE  RA E  MANMEMEPr  OF  ADDI77OA?L
ON:  DUAL  OFFICIAL  RATE  EXCHANGE
MARKET  RtATE
Capital  Accouns  Curmrnt  WJIEN  POST
Accomnt  MFRS  MERS
Angola  yes 75-90  yoe 75-90  lllogal  tolerated  black  75.90  fixod  not  unifid
Burundi  yos 70-90  yes 70.90  illegal 70.90  black 70.90  fixed 70-86  not  Ifnid  ed
peg 16-90
Ethhopia  yes  70-90  yes 70-90  illegal tolerated  black  70-90  peg  not  unified  no
Ghana  ye. 70.90  yes 70-90  illcgal tolerated  black 70488  fixed  70-13  r.  yeau  73.90
legal 85-90  peg 13-88  unirted 4.88
Kenya  black 70.90  peg  not unified  yes 79-90
Malawi  ye.  70.90  ye, 70-90  illegal tolerated  black 70-90  peg  not unified  no
Nigeria  yea 70-90  yes 70-85  illegal tol. 70-87  black 70-87  peg 70-90  free  yes 86-89
no 86-90  legal 87-90  lgal  87-90  unified 8.90-
Rwanda  ye  70-90  yes 76-90  fixed
S. Lcono  ye. 70-5.86  illegal 70-12.12  legal 12.82-7.83  fixed  unified 83  yes 70-86
no 6.1C4.87  leg. 12.82-7.83  legal 1.84-9.84  unified 8S
yea 587-90  leg. 1.84-9.84
leg. 6.86-4.87
Sudan  yea 70-90  yes 70-90  illegal tol. 7-87  black 70-90  fixed  nol unified  yes
Tan-ani  yes 70-90  yes 70-90  illegal tolerated  black 70-90  peg  not uified  yes 82-85
Thc Gambia  yea 70-86  yes 7175  illegal 70-86  black 70-86  fixed 70-86  unified
no  87-90  no  77-S0  legal S6-90  legal 87-90
yes 81-86
no  87-90
Uganda  yes 70-86  yea 70-90  legal 70-82  black 70-90  peg  not unified  yes
yes 88-90  illegal 83-84
legal  85-90
Zaire  yes 71-90  yes 71-90  illegal tol. 70-83  black 70-13  peg  free  yes 9.78-83
legal 13-84  legal 83-84  unified 8.19
illegal tol. 84-90  black 84-90
Zambia  yea 70-90  yes 70-90  illegal tol. 70-85  blick 70-85  fixed 70-76  not unified  yea 2.80-87
legal 85-87  legal 85-87  peg 76-87
illegal 87-90  black 87-89  fixed 87-90
Zimnbabwe  yes 80-90  yes 80-90  illegal 80-90  bliek 1090  fixed  not unified  yes 84-90
MERS : Multiple Exchange  Rate Systems.
ADDITIONAL  ER: Special exchange  rates for cenain transactions.  In some  Cases,  there was no dual market, even  though the official exchange
rate was fixed or pegged.
Source: Kiguel and O'ConneL (1992); IMF and World Currency Yearbook (various  issues).5
Table 2: Parallel  Market Excbange Rate Premium (percent)
Country  1974-80  1981-86  1990-91
Sub-Saharan  adusters  la
Extremely  hig  premiums  in 1990-91  - 1  16.
Mauritania  . 62.3  121.5  166.6
Mozarbique  468.5  2,110.8  62.6
Sierra Leone  21.0 /b  49.4  104.4
Tanzania  125.7  248.8  74.5
Zambia  117.3  46.3  149.7
M.  I 37.7 /c  43.7  47.5
Medium  premium
Burundi  20.3 Ic  24.1  20.9
The Gambia  -5.4 /c  13.8  21.3 Id
Malawi  74.5  53.6  29.4
Nigeria  63.3  232.7  25.1
Uganda  728.3  190.0  24.6
Zimbabwe  102.2  81.3  23.5
Low  premium
Ghana  276.6  1,098.2  3.4
Guinea  130.7  655.2  7.6
Guinea-Bissau  ..  59.7  -2.3 /d
Kenya  12.5  15.1  7.3
Madagascar  19.3 Ic  42.0  7.1 Id
Mean  140.9  299.2  45.5
Excluding Mozambique  119.1  186.0  44.4
Median  68.9  59.7  24.6
Other  adjusting countries
Argentina  94.5  32.8  42.4 Id
Bolivia  8.3  -136.2  1.5 Id
Costa Rica  9.2  204.7  15.9 Id
Indonesia  2.4  4.2  2.6 /d
Mexico  1.7  13.9  6.8 /d
Morocco  5.3  6.0  13.1 Id
Philippines  7.1  12.3  7.1 /d
Thaiand-  -0.6  -2.2  2.0  /d
Turkey  25.7  9.6  2.4 /d
Venezuela  0.0  110.3  5.2 /d
. Mean  15.3  52.8  9.9
Medianm  6.2  13.1  6.0
..Not available
Note:  The parallel market exchange rate premium is calculated as the parallel market exchange rate
minus the official exchange rate (in domestic currency at the end of the period), multiplied by  100.
a.  Data are only for the countries with flexible exchange rates
b.  Data are for 1979-80
c.  Data are for 1976-80
d.  Data are for 1990
Sources:  "Adjustment in Africa  Reforms, Results and the Road Ahead". Policy Research Department, The World Bank,
1993.6
strong  links  to the macroeconomy  (Kiguel  and  Ghei, 1992)  covering  a large  sample  of developing
countries  (six of which  are in SSA)  during 1970-89;  Aron and Elbadawi  (1992) for Zambia;
Elbadawi  (1992)  for the Sudan; Kaufmnann  and O'Connell  (1991)  for Tanzania;  Chhibber  and
Shafik  (1990)).
These strong macro-linkages  emphasize  the importance  of the negative macro-implications
associated  with multiple  exchange  markets  (well-known  to exist  for the Latin  American  case  of
official  multipSe  marketsa, they have been shown to apply too for the SSA case  of unofficial
multiple markets (Miguel  and O'Connell; 1992)).  These include the diversion  of trade and
productive  activity  into  unofficial  channels,  narrowing  the-tax  base;  an implicit  tax on exports  due
to  real overvaluation;  prices influenced  by  the black market, and subject to  considerable
fluctuations;  a fall in savings  with  the flight  from  domestic  currency,  limiting  domestic  investment
and constraining  long-term  growth. Further distortions  were introduced  by the administrative
allocation  of foreign  exchange.
Thus,  with substantial  parallel  markets  present  in SSA  from  the mid-1970s,  the  traditional
reform  objectives  of stabilizing  the macro-economy  and achieving  real depreciation  became
equivalent  to the objectives  of integrating  the parallel marlket  into the official  economy  and
unifying  the exchange  rates.3a Allied  with this objective  is the removal  of distortions  in the
allocation  of foreign  exchange.  Consequently,  as part of broader  reform  programs,  a divergence
away  from fixed  exchange  rate regimes  (in countries  without  convertibility)  towards  more  flexible
regimes  has been  evident  in SSA  during  the last  two decades.  The pattern  of changes  in exchange
rate arrangements  for the SSA  countries  as a whole  is illustrated  in Table 3.
2! The typical arrangement involves an official market with tie  exchange  rate detcrmined by the authorities, and a
second market where  market rorces  determine the  rate.  The official market usually channels current account
transactions of the public sector, and selected  trnsactions  of the private  sector; while the second  markct channels the
remaining  transactions.
3! The relevant concept of unification where capital controls are retained to some degree, is not eradication but a
substantial reduction of the paralle  market, in order to delink it from the major sectors of the economy.*:  :  ~~~~~~~~~7
Table 3:  The  Evolution  or Exchange  Rate Arrangements  in  Sub-Saharan  African
Countries:  1976-89.
Exchange  Rate Regime  1976  1980  1963  1989  1991
Pegged to a Single Currency  77.7  63.4  53.5  51.2  45.7
US Dollar  25.0-  19.5  14.0  12.8  10.9
French Franc  36.0  34.2  30.2  35.9  30.4
Other Currencies  16.7  9.7  9.3  2.5  4.3
Pegged to a Composite  of Currencies  19.5  31.7  37.2  30.8  23.9
Limited Flexibility  2.8  0.0  - 2.::  0.0  0.0
More Flexible Arrngements  0.u  4.9  6.9  17.9  30A.
Adjusted  According to a Set of Indicators  0.0  0.0  0.0  2 5  6.5
other Managed Floating  0.0  4.9  6.9  7.7  10.9
Independently  Floating  0.0  0.0  0.0  7.7  13.0
Toial (percentage)  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
More flth  One Rate for Imports andlor  11.1  12.2  20.9  12.8  10.9
Exports
SOURCE:  IMF,  Exchange  Arrangements  and  Exchange  Restrictions  (various issues)8
The proportion of countries pegging to a single currency declined from 78 percent in
1976  to 46 percent in 1992; with pegs specifically  to the US dollar falling from 25 to I I percent.
However,  excluding the  countries in  the CFA  zone,  which  maintained a  currency union
arrangement pegging  to the French franc throughout  the period, the table shows single currency
peg regimes declined  by two-thirds between 1976 and 1992. To neutralize the negative impact
of fluctuations in exchange rates of major currencies, an increasing number of countries chose
to peg to a composite  basket of currencies (notably the SDR): the proportion rose from 20 to 24
percent between 1976 and 1992. By 1992  some form of flexible exchange  rate arrangement was
introduced in nearly a third of SSA countries, increasing from a negligible 3 percent in 1976.
Also notable in the table is the extent to which official multiple exchange rates were utilized
during the early 1980s  as a transitional medium  to more efficient  exchange rate regimes. Overall,
however, fixed rather than flexible rate regimes remain dominant in SSA.
The impact of exchange rate reform on the black market premia during three reform
periods, shown in Table 2, presents a rather mixed picture: some clear successes (e.g. 'Ghana);
some improvements  (e.g. Mozambique,  Tanzania) and several policy reversals (e.g. Zambia). In
the light of the preceding discussion, the objective of a realistic exchange rate reflecting market
conditions should be the primary objective for a hig.  premium economy undertaking exchange
rate  reform. Initially this objective should have greater priority than a  second objective of
stabilizing the exchange rate.4r Stabilization  is crucial in some Latin American countries where
the feed-through coefficient from official devaluation,  to inflation in near hyper-inflationary
conditions  is high (e.g. 0.6 for Bolivia, Dominguez  (1991)). In SSA countries  with large premia,
many prices already reflect the parallel exchange rate so that official devaluation is unlikely to
have a significant  effect on inflation (Aron  and Elbadawi, 1992; Chibber and Shafik, 1990). With
the achievement  of sufficient real depreciation  to create a sustainable  unification  of multiple  rates,
a stable exchange rate will  -assume increasing importance. At this point, exchange rate policy in
-4/ The measurenent of exchangcrate instability  poses some problems.  Pritchett  (1991)  suggests  that the third  momcnts
about the mean (skewness and kurtosis) are a feasible measure of exchange  ratc uncerainty (volatility)  given that
variance is not defined for sernes  that exhibit persistence (the official and black rates usually foliow a non-stationary
series process  - see for instan'e  Aron and  Elbadawi,  1993a).9
small,  open economies is driven by two conflicting objectives.51  Allowing flexibility in  the
exchange rate can achieve and maintain international competitiveness6/  in the face of internal
and external price shocks, and ensure a viable balance of payments; on the other hand, a stable
exchange rate can anchor domestic prices.
What lessons can be learned from the recent experience of SSA countries in fDrmulating
exchange rate policies, and in the choice of an exchange rate regime to achieve these policy
objectives? In particular, what explains the successes and failures of unification in SSA countries?
And for countries without significant  black markets (due to unification, or currency convertibility
(CFA zone)), what evidence is there for the comparative benefits of fixed versus flexible rates?
Table  4  classifies the  individual SSA  countries according  to  the  exchange  rate
arrangements  outlined in Table 3. In terms of broad policy regimes, these countries can be placed
into the following three groups:
(i)  Countries with fixed  exchange rates, closed capital accounts, and selective price
controls (e.g. countries pegged to a basket of currencies);
(i)  Countries with flexible exchange rates (devaluing periodically, using a crawling peg,
employing an auction or floating with an interbank market), a closed capital account,
and a closed/open trade account;
3iii)  Countries with fixed exchange  rates, fully convertible  currencies and no price controls
(CFA zone).
The successes and failures of the countries from Group Q)  in achieving exchange rate
unification through more flexible exchange rate regimes (Group (ii)) are examined in the section
below, with recourse to various empirical studies, and policy lessons are drawn. Then recent
studies on the CFA zone are explored to draw lessons for the usefulness of fixed versus flexible
exchange rates for countries with currency convertibility,  but subject to SSA  struchural  conditions
of  susceptibility to  terms of trade  and  other exogenous shocks, and  fragmented or  poorly
developed markets in various sectors (including banking).
Cordcn  (1990) discusses  thd dual roles  of  the  xchangc  mte in macroecononic policy,  defining  the disinct  'rea)
targets'  and 'nominal anchor" approaches.
61 The real  exchange  ae,  defined as the  relativc prices  of naontradablcs with  mspect to tmadables, is a  proxy for a
country's  international competitivcness.10
A. Exchange Rate Unification: Lessons From Successes and Failures
Using Flexible Rate Regimes in SSA.
The implementation  of exchange rate unification  has varied across countries and as shown above
has resulted in successful cases - Ghana, Uganda and Tanzania - and not so successful cases -
Zambia and the Sudan. The different outcomes  result from the speed of the unification process,
the sequencing  of accompanying  policy  measures, the commitment  of the authorities  to the reform
and the availability  of external budgetary and balance  of payments support. According  to Kiguel
and O'Connell (1992), unification in SSA countries must be done as quickly as possible, at least
for current account transactions.  In many of these countries, because of the scarcity of foreign
exchange, unification  has the limited objective of allowing the most current account transactions
to take place in one officially recognized market, keeping some control on capital movements,
and thereby justifying a secondary market for foreign exchange (which may be illegal or quasi-
legal - a black market; or legalized - bureaux de changes). Most of the unification experiences
in  SSA have  been  gradual.  However a  few  countries have moved directly  to  currency
convertibility  in an interbank foreign exchange market CThe  Gambia).1i
There are a number of means by which a gradual unification has been attempted by
SSA countries:
(i)  Occasional devaluations whilst pegged to a currency basket or single currency.
(ii)  A crawling peg, where the rate moves in a pre-announced fashion (e.g. Ghana 1983-
86; Zambia 1983-85).
7/ Since 1986, the Central Bank and the three commercial banks in the Gambia have traded at
weeldy "fixing" sessions, establishing  a rate of exchange closely linked to the previous week's
interbank rate, but used only for statistical  purposes and immediately  superseded by the interbank
rate.  Bureaux de change were legalized in 1990, and have  joined the weekly session, improving
competition. The weekly meeting has given the Central Bank a handle on market developments
and also a monitoring presence. The Central Bank is a net purchaser in the interbank market for
reserve accumulation purposes.  The interbank market seems to  have functioned relatively
smoothly in The Gambia: however, there have been only modest  transactions between the banks,
and despite the early removal of capital controls, it functions more as a flow than an asset
market.Table 4: Exchange Rate Arrangernents in Individual Sub-Saharan  African Countries,  1990
Exchange Rate Pegged to US Dollar
- Angola**  - Liberia
- Djibouti  - Sierra Leone
- Ethiopia"t
Exchange Rate Pegged to French Franc
- Benin  - Cote d'Ivoire
- Burkina Faso  - Equatorial  Guinea
- Cameroon  - Gabon
- CAR  - Mali
- Chad  - Niger
- Comoros  - Senegal
- Congo  - Togo
Exchange Rate Pegged to South African Rand
= Lesotho  - Swaziland
Exchange Rate Pegged to a Basket of Currencies
SDR
- Burundi  - Seychelles
- Rwanda  - Zambia*
Other
- Botswana  - Mozamnbique**
- Cape Verde  - Sao Tome  and Principe*
- Kenya  - Tanzania*
- Malawi*  - Uganda*
- Mauritius  - Zimbabwe
Managed Floating Exchange Rate
- Guineat  - Madagascar*
- Guinea-Bissau*  - Mauritania
Independently Floating Exchange Rate
- The Gambia*  - Zaire*
Multiple Exchange Rates
- Ghana  - Somalia
- Nigeria  - Sudan
Countries with widespread  black markets, restrictions  on capital  accounts and selective price controls.
-Countries  wilh widcspread  black markcts, rcstrictions on capital accounts  and cxtensive price controls but with a
lack of effective implementation.
(In Ethiopia, the controls are effective).12
(iii)  Official  dual  markets,  with one exchange rate determined by the authorities and
applying to public sector and selected private sector transactions, and a second rate
determined by market forces for the remaining transactions (e.g. Z;ambia  1990-91).
(iv)  Foreign exchange auctions, where the rate is determined weekly or fortnightly as the
marginal or average rate bid when auctioning a fixed supply of foreign exchange to
importers or banks (e.g. Zambia 1985-87; Ghana:  1986-92; Nigeria 1986-92; Uganda
1983-85, 1992-93).
(v)  A market  pricng  rule for administered allocation of foreign exchange: currently a
number of countries allocate foreign exchange by means of a first-in-first-out queue,
pricing at the free rate in the legalized bureaux de change market (e.g. Zambia 1992-;
Mozambique 1992-). Another example  would be following a purchasing  power parity
rule.
The experience of the first two approaches is that wit  adverse external shocks, large
fiscal deficits and low policy credibility, occasional  devaluations  or an accelerated crawl have
failed to provide sufficient adjustment  to sustainably unify multiple markets (Elbadawi, 1990).
Nevertheless, significant  reductions in black market premia have been achieved with a crawling
peg (e.g. Ghana, 1983-6). Tanzania provides another example: in 1986, a reform program was
launched, which included significant adjustments in the exchange rate,  monetary and fiscal
policies, increases in the interest rates and producer prices, and relaxation of price controls. The
premium dropped from above 700 percent in early 1986  to about 50 percent in mid-1990 (KCiguel
and O'Connell, 1992). Zambia in the period July 1983 to October 1985 adopted a crawling peg
system for the official rate, accompanied by restrictive monetary and fiscal policy. This effort
was unsuccessful, however, due to large exogenous  shocks in terms of trade shocks, and foreign
aid, and to "the fundamental  endogeneity  of the parallel premium with respect to macroeconomic
and trade policy" (Aron and Elbadawi, 1992).
Official dual exchange rates have frequently been used as a temporary measure: there
is a gradual transfer of transactions from the various exchange markets (including the black
market) into one particular  ket.  Ultimately the official rates are unified. Both the Sudan and
Zambia used dual markets, but without  striking success in eitier case. Sudan allowed a secondary
legal market with a floating exchange  rate to operate alongside  the official market, shifting  import13
categories from the official market to  the secondary market over  time. These  efforts were
accompanied by successive devaluations in the managed rate, in  the context of liberalization
programs. However, the lack of suppoiting fiscal policy resulted in depreciation in the legal
secondary market. As the authorities  tried to enforce a more appreciated rate, transactions shifted
to the black market, and there was a reappearance of a large black market premium. A similar
story holds for Zambia. Early in 1990, an official rate was designated for -government imports,
debt service, purchase by govermnent of copper receipts from the state-owned copper sector, and
imports not on a positive list for the secondary official market. A more depreciated market rate
was applied to all transactions on the positive list: initially only 10 percent of imports by item
were on the list, but at the unification of the official rates in April,  1991, over 90 percent of
imports had been transferred to  this  window. Unfortunately the term  "market rate"  was a
misnomer: the second rate was managed and real depreciation resisted by the authorities. Given
the high  levels of  inflation in  the  period due  to  insufficiently supportive fiscal  policy,  at
"unification' a thriving black market persisted with a premium of over 100 percent.
Since the early 1980s, foreign exchange auctions have been fairly widely used outside
SSA (e.g.  Jamaica,  Bolivia, Romania,  Russia, Khazakstan), as  well as  in  over  nine SSA
countries. Auctions operate like a hybrid between a crawling peg system and a floating rate: the
pricing and allocationt  of foreign exchange are fully market-determined,  but this rate persists until
the next auction. Auctions in SSA have typically been held weekly or fortnightly (e.g.  Ghana,
1986-92, Zambia 1985-87, Uganda  1992-93). However, auctions have also been used as an
allocation mechanism for governLment  foreign exchange in the context of an  interbank market
determination of  the exchange rate  (Nigeria 1989-92). Auctions may have advantages over
moving directly to a floating rate in al.  nterbank market where there is insufficient institutional
depth to  allow effective functioning of a decentralized foreign exchange market, where a few
commercial banks have historically been dominant and there is danger of collusion, or where
there are limited sources of foreign exchange (Krumm, 1985; Quirck-et al, 1987).
In a typical auction the bidders are importers or commercial banks acting as direct
agents of importers (retail auctions e.g. Zambia, Ghana); or commercial banks bidding only for
themselves, later allocating freely to importers in a secondary market (wholesale auctions e.g.
Nigeria, Ghana). The bids are integrated price and quantity bids. These bids are lined up from14
highest to lowest price, and the marginal rate is  that rate which fully exhausts the available
(perhaps pre-announced)  supply. In a competitive auction the marginal rate is the exchange rate
and is paid by bidders regardless of their bids. In a Dutch or discriminatory  auction,  bidders
pay their own price, and the exchange rate may be a quantity-weighted  average of the bids, or
the marginal price.
Auctions also offer various control variables to the authorities: the supply offered, a
choice of pricing mechanism-  (competitive  or discriminatory), the use of a reserve price (below
which the authorities  will not accept bids), the possibility  of revealing information  about the bids,
and the right to  impose entry restrictions of various kinds. Thus, unless the operation of the
auctions is fully transparent, adhering to published rules,  the potential exists for government
manipulation of the exchange rate.  A recent statistical and econometric  study using weekly data
for foreign exchange auctions in-  four SSA countries (Ghana 1986-92, Nigeria 1986-88, Zambia
1985-87  and Uganda 1992-3) found a clear distinction  between two sets of countries in terms of
design features, auction policies and outcomes (Aron and Elbadawi, -1993 a,b).  Ghana and
Uganda represent a set where auctions have been largely on target in terms of the three policy
objectives of  exchange rate  unification, stabilization of  the  exchange rate  and  an  efficient
allocation of foreign exchange (Figure I b,c).  On the other hand, the auctions in Zambia and
Nigeria were subject to frequent policy interventions, with the consequence of unsustainable
auctions, inefficieut allocation through ad hoc disqualifications (at least in Zambia), limited
unification, and a rather volatile exchange rate (Figure 1 a,d). A distributional  analysis  found the
distribution of the auction rate exhibits left skewness (tendency towards appreciation) in Nigeria
and Zambia; while the opposite was observed for Ghana and Uganda.15
FIGURE  1 a,b,c,d:  The prallel premium  and auction  exchange  rate relationship  (source:  Aron
and Elbadawi,  1993a).
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and a stable exchange rate in Zambia  and Nigeria could be attributed  to the absence  of a reserve
price rule. The results suggested that use of a fairly predictable reserve price stabilizes  foreign
exchange auctions, given the limited depth of SSA financial markets. The rule is learned by
bidders, and diminishes speculative bidding. The management of a sustainable and credible
reserve  price pol icy requires  an efficient  secondary  market. The use of legalized  bureaux markets
in Uganda and Ghana had two advantages  in this respect: they are likely to be deeper markets,
and moreover eliminate the risk-premium associated with illegality. Macro-economic  policy
remains crucial  to the success of the reserve  pricing policy (Aron and Elbadawi, 1993a).  A stable
and consistent macro-economic  environment,  permitted  the development  of a stable and steadily
depreciating  bureaux  rate in Ghana  and Uganda, while  the highly volatile illegal  parallel rate was
not suitable as  a  guide for policy in  Zambia and Nigeria.  Auction rate  depreciation as a
consequence  of increased liberalization  and hence competition  in the auctions, is consistent  with
fundamental  market  behavior, and as such stabilizes  the auction and fosters long-term  unification.
This has been the experience of Ghana and Uganda. In contrast Nigeria and Zambia attempted
to stem depreciation  through increased entry restrictions (and ad hoc disqualifications)  over time:
these policies back-fired and merely increased  damaging speculative  behavior. Given the initial
conditions of thin and rather rudimentary  financial markets in SSA, an important lesson from
Ghana and Uganda is that there may be advantages from a more gradual liberalization for
allowing  institution-building  and learning by agents in the market (bidders, bureaux, commercial
banks, and the auction managers (Central Bank)). This may facilitate the transition to a more
competitive  interbank market, as was the case in Ghana Qn  contrast  to Nigeria). Gradualism  may
also be justified from a macro-perspective,  given the substantial macro-imbalances  and the low
credibility that often characterize initial conditions  in reforming SSA countries.
Estimations  of the equilibrium exchange rate established that choosing Dutch over
competitive  pricing does not provide an automatic  revenue advantage, except when there are a
small number of bidders engaging in strategic behavior, or where risk-aversion is paramount.
However, the  Dutch auction  may introduce other undesirable features such as  enhanced
opportunities  for collusive practices, a reduced  pool of bidders and inefficiencies  associated  with
a multiple  rate system- The estimation  results found that while supply  volatility does not producea risk-premium on the level of the auction rate, there is evidence that it is important  for auction
rate volatility. Thus, the stability of foreign aid could play an important role in compensating  for
fluctuations in  export earnings induced by trade shocks and/or natural disasters. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that under the auctions system the efficiency of  allocation does  improve
compared to the previous system of ad-hoc allocation under a fixed rate. However, it is to be
expected  that ad hoc disqualifications  as occurred in Zambia  diminished  these advantages.  Finally,
the evidence fTom  Ghana and Uganda as against Nigeria and Zambia, suggests the paramount
importance of transparent policy rules and conduct of the auctions. Lack of transparency is
tantamount to unnecessary increased discretion by the auction managers, thus exacerbating one
of the major potential weaknesses  of the auction regime. Most of these results are supported by
an earlier study (Mills,-  1988). In their policy dialogue and adjustment  lending, the IMF and the
World Bank have favored  the unification  of exchange rates (particularly  official and black market
exchange rates) on the grounds that multiple rates misallocate  resources. However, using the
experience  of Ghana, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone, Pinto (1989) shows that this argument tends to
overlook an important consideration which is inflation, "when multiple rates are means of
taxation, the widened deficit from unification increases inflation."
Pinto (1989) argues for the primacy of fiscal policy and the need to design the pace of
exchange  rate policy  to be consistent  with fiscal reform. The driving idea behind  this prescription
is that, if the fiscal deficit is not sufficiently  reduced, premature policy of an accelerated crawl,
for  example, when the  public sector is  a  net buyer of  foreign exchange, would lead to
unsustainablepost unification  inflation  as the authorities  find themselves  forced  to rely exclusively
on inflation tax to replace the foregone implicit revenue derived from the taxation of exports
through premiums. This begs the question: What has been the trade-off between the benefits of'
the unification of exchange rates for resource allocation and its costs for inflation in  SSA?
Evidence is provided by Kaufmann and O'Connell (1990) for the case of Tanzania. To study the
fiscal impact of the unification, Kaufinann  and O'Connell have calculated the financial position
of the government vis-A-vis  the private sector to determine  whether the government is a net buyer
of fbreign exchange from the private sector.  Preliminary calculations suggest that Tanzania is
on the favorable side of this calculation. Given the large inflows of aid being channeled by the
government, increases in the official exchange rate provide a fiscal bonus, lowering the fiscal19
deficit in domestic currency  terms. Devaluation  will have a positive  effect on revenue collection.
This study  suggests  that official exchange rate adjustments, in the course of unification,  are not
likely to contribute  to inflation  by way of fiscal channels.
B. Fixed vs. Flexible Rates Under Currency Convertibility:
Lessons From the CFA Zone.
Until  the end of the  1970s, CFA  countries!? had better  inflation records than other SSA
countries9/  and a superior growth rate. Early studies examining  the performance of CFA zone
countries in the 1970s and first half of the 1980s  attributed the long-run growth of output and
investnent (including foreign investment)  to monetary stability, low inflation,  the convertibility
of the CFA franc and built-in restraints on fiscal and monetary policy (e.g. Guillaumont  and
Guillaumont,  1984; Devarajan  and de Melo, 1987; Guillaumont,  et a]. 1988b).  It has been argued
that the fixed exchange  rate regime for CFA zone countries  has been a contributing  factor to their
low inflation  rates (Guillaumont,  et al, 1988b).  However, Chhibber (1991) and Honohas (1990)
consider that lower inflation in countries with fixed exchange rates has more to do with the
underlying  financial and monetary  arrangements,  and the openness  of the capital  accounts  between
countries, than the fixed nature of the exchange rate.lio Moreover, depreciation  of the French
fainc (CFA currency peg) in the 1970s helped to counteract worsening terms of trade in the
region, especially  after 1973 (Elbadawi, 1991).
The performance of the  CFA countries relative to  other SSA countries changed
dramatically  after 1985, with a severe economic  decline in the zone. Greater turbulence  in terms
of trade patterns were experiencediis, as well as an appreciating  French franc vis a vis the US
!/  The countries  comprising  the CFA zone  were shown in Table 3.
9/  Median annual inflation  in CFA countries was 11.6 percent in the 1970s, declining to 4 percent in the 1980s;
whereas inflation  in aU SSA countries  was 14 percent in the 1970s, and about 17.3 percent in the 199S0s.
10/ For instance,  countries  such as Ghana,  Uganda and Sierra Leone  experienced  th-x  digit inflation  rates even when
the cxdcnge  rate  was fixed (most prices being influenced  by the parallel exchange  rate).
1Il Elbadawi and Majd (1992a) (sec Table 3, p.15) evaluated the external  shocks for SSA countries  and for CPA
countries. Comparing  1982-85  with 1l973-81  extemal  shocks  (computed  as the sum of tenns  of trde  and real interest
- effects) and internal shocks (narrowly defined and proxied by the index of food production) were  higher in SSA.20
dollar. Furthermore, significant real depreciation occurred in key export competitors in SSA.
CFA countries were unable to use nominal realignments as a tool to cope with real shocks;
instead, they relied on the tight domestic policies through credit controls and fiscal discipline.
Whether adherence to a fixed rate regime in the presence of large real shocks disadvantaged  the
zone is considered in a recent study by Elbadawi  and Majd (1992). CFA membership is evaluated
in two periods: the 1980s relative to the 1970s, and 1986-89 relative to  1982-85; and economic
performance is compared to other SSA countries, and to a broader set of similar developing
countries (including SSA).
The first part of the analysis compares long-run and short-run economic performance
of these three groups by IDoking  at the evolution of simple averages of key macroeconomic
indicators. Contrasting the 1980s witd the  1970s, CFA countries appear to  have been out-
performed by countries in the other two groups; moreover, the competitive position of CFA
countries was weaker in the second half of the 1980s than in the first half. These results are
consistent with the conclusions  of Devarajan and Rodrik (1991) that fixed exchange rates have
been, on the whole, a bad bargain for CFA member countriesr:  "  ....  for most of the CFA
members, the inflation  benefits do not appear to have been large enough to offset the costs on the
output side. Under "reasonable"  output-inflation  tradeoffs, these countries would  have been better
off having the flexibility to adjust to external shocks."
However, the second portion  of Elbadawi  and Majd's analysis  adjusts for te  selectivity
bias in the CFA membership decision and uses a modified control group approach (Corbo and
Rojas, 1990). This approach leads to more shaded results  controlling for initial conditions,
internal  and external shocks  and policy  stance, the CFA members  wereritperformed  in the short-
run by other SSA and low-income countries in output growth, export, investment, and savings
performance (though not  in inflation). This  suggests that the CFA  monetary rules,  while
producing inflation stability,  were  inadequate in  bringing about  the  necessary short-run
adjustment. On the other hand, the CFA countries seemed to have done relatively well in the
Comparing 1986-89  with 1982-85, external shocks where significantly  higher in CFA than SSA but intemal shock
were lower. Comparing  1982-89  with 1973-81,  CFA recorded higher  exlernal  shocks and SSA higher  intcrnal shocks.
121  These results are based  on Devarajanand  de Melo's (1990)  reassessment- in view of the performanceofthe CFA
countries in the 1980s - of the empirical  evidcnce found in Devarajan  and de Mclo (1987).21
long-run. But, this is not a strong  conclusion  as sufficient  evidence  is lacking;  the study shows
a higher long-run  growth rate for CFA countries  vs. other SSA countries  in only one of its
numerous  regressions. The study  does not resolve  the apparent  trade-off  between  growth  and
inflation  in the zone.22
3
Exchange Rate Reform and Supply Response
This section is organized as follows. First, the theoretical literature is briefly reviewed. Second,
comparative studies on the impact of devaluation on output, and on economic performance in
developing countries, including SSA countries, will be discussed.  Finally, the supply response
of devaluation  in SSA countries will be examined  in detail, with a particular focus on agriculture.
A. Overview of the Theory
While it is widely accepted that a properly administered devaluation will improve the trade
balance and change relative prices, there is little consensus in devaluations' effect on output and
employment. Devaluation  will either have an expansionary  effect on aggregate output, or, in the
worst case, will reduce aggregate output.13f Typically in the literature, the distinction is made
between elasticities, absorption, and monetary approaches.  The crucial assumption in these
models are price flexibility, the degree of capacity utilization, and the emphasis on the demand
side of the economy.
The elasticities approach  assumes  that prices are fixed, and that a nominal  devaluation
will result in an equiproportional  real devaluation. Because the analysis takes place in a partial
equilibrium framework  1o/  the  effects on  output and  employment are not  explicit.  If  the
elasticities approach is embodied in a Keynesian model where output is assumed to be demand
13/  Some alathors consider that,  in the long run, the loss of output due to the tempomry  eallocation of factors of
production towards trmdable goods is possible.
10f The elasticities approach assumes that the economy is small and in external equilibrium;  this approach sts  that a
devaluation will be cffcdive Cumprove  the balance of payments) as long as the Marshall-Lerner  conditions hold.23
determined and there exists unutilized production, then the impact of a nominal devaluation on
output and emnployment  is positive.
According  to the absorption approach,  the effectiveness  of a nominal devaluation will
depend on its ability to generate expenditure switching (the composition of expenditures must
move from foreign to domestic goods) and expenditure reducing (expenditures must fall with
respect to income).  If a nominal devaluation induces expenditure switching, then it will affect
relative prices and thus, the real exchange rate.  If there are unutilized resources, expenditure
switching will generate an increase in real output and thus, improvement of the current account.
For aggregate output, a devaluation that has a positive effect on the real exchange rate, and that
generates expenditure switching, will have a positive effect on the aggregate level of activity.
The monetary approach  focuses on the interaction between  the external sector and the
monetary side of the economy.  The monetarist model assumes that resources are fully utilized
and that the uncovered "interest  parity" condition and the "purchasing power parity" condition
hold.  Consequently, domestic prices cannot fall out of line with respect to foreign prices.  A
devaluation will be offset by an increase in domestic prices and the real exchange rate will not
be affected.  Similarly, output will stay at its full employment  level.  In this setting, however,
if domestic credit  is kept constant, a  devaluation will have a temporary effect on the trade
balance. The trade balance will improve to the extent that the real balance effect will depress
absorption and, through price increases, will reduce the real value of household wealth. Contrary
to the Keynesian model, even in the absence of  a devaluation, the full flexibility of prices
guarantees that the automatic adjustment  mechanism will work quickly and effectively to remove
any disequilibrium in the economy (and there would be no need for devaluation).
In contrast to traditional views discussed above, several theoretical arguments have
been put forth to explain why a devaluation  can have a negative effect on output.  The emphasis
was initially put on the demand side.  Diaz-Alejandro (1963) was among the first to raise this
possibility.nL;  He shows that a devaluation may lead to a reduction in real income using a
model with relatively price-inelastic exports, imports and consumption functions based on higher
propensities for non-wage earners.  This result is produced by transferring real income from
II/  Se  Cooper  (1971).24
workers who receive a fixed nominal wage, to capitalists with higher propensities  to save factor
income.  Krugman and Taylor (1978) have extended and formalized this view.  They argue that
a devaluation  can be contractionary to the extent that it generates, through its effects on the price
level, a negative real balance effect. This, in turn, will result in lower aggregate demand and,
under some circumstances, lower output.jLy-
In addition to these demand effects, there are a number of supply-side  channels through
which devaluation can be contractionary (besides being inflationary). Bruno (1979) makes two
arguments to support the view that, in a developing country, a devaluation will increase firms'
input costs and need for working capital.  First, he argues that inputs for manufacturing are
imported and not  easily substituted domestically.  Bruno also states that a devaluation will
increase the need for working capital for firms whose acquisition  of working capital is dependant
on banks subject to rationing.  This will increase interest rates and the demand for funds, which
may lead firms to reduce production.  Thus, the positive effect of increased production will be
offset by higher relative prices.  If relative prices are delayed, in the short run, it is possible that
the negative effect on aggregate  supply may prevail.  Van Wijnbergen (1986) developed a model
with intermediate goods and a financial (curb) market.  Like Bruno, he stresses the impact of a
devaluation on the domestic currency costs of imported inputs, as well as its negative effect on
firms' working capital.  He also discusses  the effect of parity changes  on external debt repayment
and on nominal wages in the presence of wage indexation.  i  Finally, Buffie (1986) warned
against the negative effect on supply which could be compounded, in the long run, by a nominal
devaluation that depresses investment  because of a higher cost of imported capital equipment.
How usefuil are these models in understanding the impact of devaluation on SSA
economies? In other words, how relevant are the assumptions  of these models for SSA countries?
The assumption  of full employment in the monetarist model is weak in the SSA context because
structural and cyclical factors keep the  economy in under-capacity utilization.  Often, SSA
countries cannot take  full advantage of  price changes because of  constraints such  as poor
121 Kzugman  and Taylor results rely on very restrictive  asswmptions  (exports are fixed, the marginal  propensity to save
of the govenmuent is equal to one, and so on).
131  See Buffic (1984).25
transportation  facilities, inefficient  research and, extension  services. The Keynesian  approach is
also lacking, given the disproportionate  attention to demand factors.
Arguments supporting  the contractionary  devaluation  hypothesis need to be examined.
In the case of the demand-side  approach, it is important  to consider  the underlying elasticities in
SSA countries.  Are the elasticities lower in SSA than in other countries? For the supply side
approach, the negative effect due to intermediate goods has diminished due to an increase in
production  of primary products in most SSA countries. Intermediate  inputs in agriculture  are not
domestically substitutable, but are used in iarge farms that are generally  financially better off.
Therefore, these inputs are not subject to rationing.
The impact  of sustained  devaluation  on SSA  economies is an empirical  matter, yet there
has been little empirical work done on the  :ontractionary effect of exchange rate changes on
economic activity in developing countries.  Empirical work exists on Latin America, but few
studies have been done on the SSA region. Interestingly,  there are several studies on the supply
response of agriculture based on SSA countries.  In the study of effects of devaluation in SSA
countries, there is an overlap between analysis of devaluation on economic performance and
analysis of the supply response of agriculture to devaluation.
B. Empirical Studies  on Contractionary  Devaluation  in Developing Countries
A number of methodologies have been presented in the literature to  analyze the effects of
devaluation on  economic performance.14/ The first approach examines changes in  country
performance at the time of devaluation, usually referred to as the "before and after" approach.
The flaw of the "before and after" approach is that it relies on the assumption  that other things
are being held equal which is highly implausible. The second approach, the so-called "control
group,"  in  principle, overcomes the  shortcoming of the  "before and  after"  approach by
distinguishing the effect of devaluation from  other factors on output.  The  "control group"
approach compares  the performance  in devaluing  countries  with performance  in a reference  group
of non-devaluing  countries to estimate  what would have happened in the devaluing countries had
141 See Goldstein and Montiel (1986) for a fronma  prescntation of these methodologies.26
devaluation not occurred.  The third approach applies econometric methods to time-series to
determine the impact of the exchange-rate changes on various performance variables.  This
approach has a number of limitations since the specification of the output equation estimated is
essentially ad-hoc.  Finally, the fourth, somewhat less direct approach, uses simulation models
or reduced-form equations to analyze the effect of the exchange rate on output.  This approach
has a major advantage-it  gives more information  on the short run dynamics of the effects of a
devaluation.  However, the results rely often on "guess estimates" of values of elasticities and
parameters. 15/
Table 5 is a  matrix giving an overview of empirical studies done on the effects of
devaluation.  In a seminal paper, Cooper (1971) employs the "before and after" approach to
examine 24 devaluations between 1959 and 1966, involving 19 developing countries (none of
which belongs to SSA).  The study assessed  the extent of the response (one year before and one
year after)  of  various elements of  aggregate demand,  balance of  payments and  inflation.
Cooper's  results show that some elements of aggregate demand demonstrate contractionary
tendencies after devaluation.  Results show, however, that the trade balance and the balance of
payments did improve in most cases.  While Cooper attempted to control for changes in the
international and domestic environment  when measuring responses to devaluation, his focus on
one-year changes was limiting. Typically, a devaluation cannot be expected  to have its principal
effect in the year after its implementation.
Kamin (1988) is one of the first studies based on the "control group"  methodology.
This  study follows the  evolution of  different variables for  seven  years  (the  year of  the
devaluation, three years before and three years after).  Kamin's research exploits data for 50 to
90 devaluations out  of a  sample of  107 (including 22 devaluation episodes in twelve SSA
countries) that took place between 1953 and 1983.  Kamin's results show that devaluation has a
positive or at least no effect on output, but a sharp and significant decline in output growth is
registered by the devaluing countries, in the year preceding the devaluation. This lower rate
15/  Empirical studics based or the "before and aiter"  appmach include Dinz Alejandro (1965), Cooper (1971),  Krueger
(1978).  Regrssion  analyses  are applied in Khan (1974), Goldstein (1974),  Miles  (1976),  Edwards  (1986),  Edwards
(1989) and Faini (1992).  Results presented in simulations  models are presented  in Gylfasn  and Shnmid  (1983) ,Gylfason
and Risagcr (1984), Solimano (1986), Brnson  (1986),  Gylfason (1991), and Agenor (1991).27
Table 5: Studies on the Effects of a Devaluation
AU7hOR  COVERAGE  ME77I0D  DEVALUA77ON  EFFECT
Cooper (1971)  24 devaluations  (1959-66)  in LDCs  Control group approach  Contraction:  trade balance and
(Africa: Morocco,  Tunisia)  B&P improve
Shechey (1986)  16 Latin American countries  Economeiric  approach  Highly  contrctionary
Edwards  12 devaluations  in LDCs (1965-80)  Economelric  approach  Short-run contraction,long-  run
(1  986b p.  139)  Africa: South Africa  (dependent  economy  model  ncutrl
with intermediate  inputs.
wage indexation  and foreign
._____________  debt)  - . ____________________dcb
Ahluwalia  and  Malaysia  Macromodel  Contraction  when export demand
Lysy  elasticity  less than 0.5
(1981)  - . . . . _  _
Gylfason  and  5 DCs (Brazil, India, Pakistan,  Macro-simulation  model  Devaluation  ia expansionary  in 8
Schmid (1983)  Philippines,  Turkey) and 5 DCs  (intemnediate  goods and open  of 10 countries.
economy)  Long-nm neutrality
Gylfason  and  3 LDCs, 7 DCs  Macro-simulation  model  Contrction  in LDCs; expansion
Risager (1984)  (Africa: Kenya,  Morocco)  in DCs; imnproved  CA all
Hamilton  Australia  Macromodel  Short-run expansion:
(1987)  long-run  contraction
Diaz-Alejandro  Argentina  lBcrorc  and aftcr  approach  Short-run  contraction
(1965)  _  _  _  _  _
Kamin (1998)  107 devaluations  in LDCs (SSA:  Control  group approach  Expansion  or no effect.
Botswana.  Burmndi,  Ghana, Rwanda,  Contraction  occurs before
Sicrra Leonc,Somalia.  Sudan. Swaziland,  devaluation  and can last after
Tanzania, Zambia)  devaluation
Edwards  18 devaluations  in Latin America  (1962-  Control group  approach  Observed decline  in growth
(1989a)  (1939b  1982)  when observed not a
p.320.24)  consequence  of devaluation  but
rather  due to accompanying
measures
Faini and de  Largc sample of LDCs  Econometrc apprtoacb  No effect on the trade balance
Melo (1990)  and output for exporters  of
ptimary goods-In  the long mru
expansionary  for cxporters of
rnanufactured  goods
Gylfason  and  12 LDCs (SSA: Sudan, Botswana,  Macro-simulation  model  CA improves,  decline in output
Radetzki  Burundi. Ethiopia,  Malawi,  Rwanda,  if wages arm  downwards
(1985)  Somnalia,  Sudan,  Tanzania)  inflexible,  specially  if there is
wage indexation.  Evidence  of
contractionary  effects  in LDCs
Donovan  12 IMF-supported  devaluations  Control group approach  Export growth improves  in the
(1981)  (1970-76)  long run,  though  noL  initially  (3
curve). Iport  growth rise but
less  than export growth28
AUTH77OR  COVERAGE  METOD  DEVALUA77ON  EFFECT
Donovan  78 IMF-supported  devaluations (1971  -0)  Control group  *pproach  Output  rall more than  LDCa
(1982)  avercge in one year comparisons
but by les  in 3  yearm
conpariuons
Gylrason  IMF supponed  programs  (1977-79)  Control group  approach  B&P improves,  effect  on output
(1987)  is inconclusive
Khan (1990)  69 LDCs  (1973-88)  Control group  approncli  Negative effect on growth
(however thc coeircients  arc  not
statisticafly  significant)
Solimno  Chile  Macro-simulation  model  Contraction  in the short-run  and
(1986)  in the  medium-run
Branson (1986)  Kenya  Macro-simulation  model  Contractionasy effect
Roca and  Peru (1977-78)  and (1980-82)  Macro-simulation  model  Contractionary  effect  due to
Priale (1987)  increase  in cost of working
capital of firms
Agenor (1991)  23 LDCs  (1978-87)  Econometric approach  Anticipated depreciation  is
(SSA: Burundi,. Canmeroon, Gabon,  contractionary  while
Malawi,  Nigeria,  Sierra  Leone, Togo.  unanticipated depreciation  is
Zaire  and Zambia)  1-  expansionary
Bhagwat and  LDCs  (1960-70)  'Before  and after'  approach  PosiLive expon  response  in the
Oatsuka  long-run,  litle  indication  of
(t974)  _  significant imnpout  respOnSe
Edwards and  48 devaluations  in LDCs  (SSA:Ghana,  Control group  approach and  Devaluation  when  accomnied
Santelln  (1992)  Zaire)  econometric approach  by restrictive  and consistent
macro-policies  an  effective
Taylor  (1979)  22 countrics  Econometric approach  Support  of expansionary
-______________________________  ____________________  _  -hypothesis
Salant  (1976)  101 devaluation  in LDCs  and DCs  'BfGore and  aficr'  approach  Balance of trade  impsroves only
in 46 cases,  B&P  improves in
76 cases29
appears to have been maintained  unchanged  throughout  the year following  the devaluation.
Insubsequent  years, the effeces  of the devaluation  on output  are positive. Edwards  (1989a)  is
another  study  that  uses the control  group approach. Analyzing  devaluation  episodes  in Latin
America,  Edwards  found  contractions  of output  in the periods  before  and after  the devaluation.
Edwards  points out that negative  output performance  in the short run may have been the
consequence  of underlying  policies  that accompanied  the devaluation,  rather than devaluation
itself.161
Edwards  (1986)  is one of the few empirical  works  using econometric  methods. His
empirical  analysis  was based  on estimating  a reduced-form  real-output  equation  using  data for
twelve developing countries (the only African country included was South Africa).r71  The
results  show  that, with other  things  being  held  equal,  devaluation  has a negative  short-run  effect
on output. After  one year, however,  this negative  effect  on output  was completely  reversed. In
the long run, devaluations  were found  to be neutral. Sheehey  (1986)  is another  study  which  uses
the econometric  approach. Sheehey  analyses  devaluation  episodes  in twelve  Latin American
countries, focusing on the short run.  His results provide evidence which supports the
contractionary  hypothesis.  In a recent  study,  Agenor  (1991)  also used an econometric  approach
to  analyze devaluation episodes in  23  developing countries-among them  nine SSA
countries-over the period 1978-87. His output  equation  was based  on a rational  expectations
model.  Contrary  to the results produced  by Edwards  (1986)  (who  used the same apprcach),
Agenor's  results show  that an anticipated  depreciation  of the real exchange  rate  has a negative
effect  on economic  activity,  while  an unanticipated  depreciation  has a positive  impact  on output.
Moreover,  the contractionary  effect  of anticipated  depreciation  remains  significant,  even  after a
year.
A paper  by Faini  and de Melo  (1990)  shows  that, for primary-goods  exporters,  a real
devaluation  has no effect  on the trade balance,  and thus on output,  whereas  for manufacturing
exporters  a real  devaluation  does  have  an effect. Employing  the econometric  approach,  Faini  and
de Melo argue that this result is due to the lack  of opportunity  to expand  exports  which are
161 See Donovan (1981).
171 The variables inclttdcd in the right  and side were: moncy growth surprises, government  expenditreb,  tenns ortrsde
and real exchange intes (a problem of auto-corelation  can occur due to the endogeneity or the real exchange variable).30
concentrated  in so few  primary  commodities.  This argument  is relevant  for SSA  countries  where
export  concentration  is high. As  of 1988,  two commodities  provided  at least  60 percent  of export
earnings  in 30 out of the 43 SSA countries  for which  export  data by commodity  are available.
(Table  A4). Faini  and  de Melo's results  assume  that  the terms  of trade are given. It is important
to note, however,  that in the econometric  approach,  it is difficult  to determine  which  channel.
suggested  by the theory is more important  since the analysis  focuses on the net effect of
devaluation  on output.
Evidence  from macro-simulation  models  provide  information  that distinguishes  the
effects of devaluation  on output through different  channels.  Gylfason  and Risager (1984)
provides  evidence  from cross-country  macro-models  on the impact  of devaluation  on real  output.
Their study shows that, while a devaluation  is likely to have a positive effect on output in
developed  countries,  it is generally  contractionary  in developing  countries. Using the same
approach,  Gylfason  and  Radetzki  (1985)  obtained  a similar  result:  contractionary  devaluation  is
more  likely to occur in developing  countries  than in developed  countries-even more so when
demand  elasticities  are low.1Us/
To summarize,  many  studies  exist  on the impact  of devaluation  on output  in developing
countries.  (See  Table 5).  The conclusions  are as follows. First, contractionary  devaluation  is
true in some  countries  but not in others. Second,  where  contractionary  devaluation  occurs, it is
short  lived;  in the long run, devaluation  effects  seem  neutral. Third, contractionary  devaluation
is more likely  to occur  in developing  rather than in developed  countries-more so when demand
elasticities  are low. Finally,  the impact  of devaluation  on output appears  to be less effective  (or
even  ineffective) in  countries exporting primary products than in  countries exporting
manufactured  goods.
C. Empirical Evidence  on Contractionary Devaluation  in SSA Countries
Are conclusions  drawn  from studies  done on developing  countries  in general  relevant  for SSA
countries?  There is a priori belief (especially  among some policymakers  in  Africa) that
IB/ Although Gylfason  and Risager's  study emphasies  the roe  of  intercst 'tes,  the  Gylfason and  RadelizW's paper
emphasizes the role of wage indexing.31
devaluation in SSA economies results in output contraction and high inflation. A few empirical
studies seem to confirm this.  For example, a study conducted by Demeke (1992) on a sample
of 30 SSA countries for the period 1980-88  concluded that the effects of currency depreciation
on output and export was at best insignificant  and that it triggered a high rate of inflation. The
effects on the current account balance  were positive  but due largely to import compression. Two
methodologies  were used in this study: the before-after  approach and the econometric  techniques.
However,  using  data  from  the  period  1965-89, Balassa (1989) analyzed SSA economic
performance in general and agriculture exports in particular.  He found that a 1 percent change
in the real exchange rate is associated with a 0.8 to 1 percent change in the ratio of exports to
output in SSA countries.  Balassa also found that the response of the export-output  ratio to the
real exchange rate changes for SSA countries is higher than for other parts of the world.  His
evidence on export shares argues against the prevailing pessimistic export position.L9/ Using
a CGE model for two African countries, Madagascar and Niger, Dorosh (1994) and Dorosh,
Essama Nssah, and Samba-Mamadou  (1994) found positive association  between real exchange
rate depreciation and changes in real exports. A RER depreciation  of 10 percent was associated
with an increase in real exports of 5.9 percent in the case of Madagascar and 3.4 percent in the
case of Niger.
In SSA economies, the tradeable sector is constituted  essebtially by the agriculture
sector. For this reason, supply response by tradeables  will be measured  by the supply response
of the agricultural  sector.  Two caveats should  be borne in mind. First, imports  of manufactured
goods are important, especially the essential products that cannot be domestically produced.
Second, tradeables, on the export side, are made up of not only agricultural products, but also
non-primary commodities  (including  mineral  products and oil). It is believed  that the results are
essentially  the same for mineral producing  countries  as for agricultural  producing  countries except
that the underlying elasticities involved  are lower.
Although SSA countries differ greatly in their geographical and physical conditions,
weather patterns, and cultural heritage, the similarity of their economic  structures is striking. In
most SSA countries, agriculture dominates the economy and for many, accounts for 30 to 60
191 BDlaa's  results rely on regrcssions hlving low coefrciunts of detecnination (the highcr is equal to 0.092),  and,
thexefom, must be interpreted  with caution.32
percent of their Gross Domestic  Product.  Except where metals and minerals  oonstituto  a
country's main  export,  agricultural  commodities  account  for two-thirds  or more  of their export
earnings.4g  In some  cases-Burundi, Chad,  COte  d'lvoire, Mali, Rwanda,  Somalia,  Sudan  and
Uganda-agricultural  products  are virtually  the only merchandise  export.;  Thus, a knowledge
of the agricultural  sector's responsiveness  provides  tho means to gauge the effects  of real
exchange  rate depreciation  on overall  economic  performance  for two reasons:  the nature  of the
agriculture  sector, it is usually  more  labor-intensive  and less  import-intensive  than  the rest of tho
economy;  and the agriculture  sector's Importance  in the tradeables  sector, and in the overall
economy.
SUPPLY  REsPoNsE  OF  MACROECONOMIC  INTERVENTIONS  ON  AGRICULTURE.
Macroeconomic  policies  have a direct and an indirect impact  on the agricultural  sector.wv
Krueger,  Schiff, and Valdes (1988) show that the indirect effects on agriculture  generally
dominate  the sectoral  direct  effects  of price interventions  in SSA  countries  such as Ghana,  Cdte
d'Ivoire and  Zambia.  Thus, typically,  the empirical  work on the supply  response  of agriculture
is measured  by numerical  estimates  of elasticities  of aggregate,  sub-sectoral  (cash  crops  and  food
crops),  and individual  crop supply  response  to price and non-price  variables. The values  found
for the underlying  elasticities  -for  the developing.  countries  are compared  to the corresponding
elasticities  for the SSA  countries.
SUPPLY  REsPoNSE OF AGRICULTURE  IN A SINGLE  CRop  SuPPLY ELAsncInEs.z/
Price incentives  are an important  element  of any exchange  rate policy aimed at stimulating
agricultural  supply. Measuring  the price  elasticities  of agriculture  is necessary  to make  a realistic
201  Congo, Gabon,  Cameroon  and  Nigeria (oil); Niger (umnium);  Siera  Leone  (diamonds);  Togo (phosphates);  Zaire
and Zambia  (copper);  Liberia  and Maurituia  (imn ore).
21/ Oil producing  countries  and counties whose  principal  exports  ane  minels  ac  different  CaWb. These  cases  will be
examined  in the Annex  Country  Case Studies of this report.
22/ For exmnple,  agriculure can be taxed relative  to inport  gubstitutes  through  a direct  effect (export  tae  and import
proection polieies)  or agriculture  can be taxed indirectly  through the ovwevalued  exchange  nate.
23/ Fora discussion  on the caveas  associated  with  the estimates  of the  elasticities  of wuppiy  zsponm, se  Oyejide  (W90).33
assessment of the supply response of agriculture. However, it is useful to keep in mind that most
empirical works are based on a partial equilibrium  set up.  Non-price incentives, such as policies
affecting infrastructure, roads, and so on, are also important.241  Studies of the supply response
on SSA agriculture have discussed whether or not the African smallholder responds normally,
quickly and efficiently  to relative price changes, or whether the institutional  constraints  limit their
response.  Empirical evidence  exists for SSA countries, assembled  by Helleiner (1975)  and Bond
(1983), which shows that the response of single crop output to price incentives is high.  Tables
Al  and A2 summarize the elasticity ranges for SSA countries.  The evidence shows that farm
producers in SSA respond to price incentives as any other farm producer in the developing
world-they  behave rationally.
FOOD CROPS  AND CASH CROPS SUPPLY  ELASTICITIFS. It  is  quite useful  to
distinguish between cash crops and food crops because of the large difference in the marketing
magnitude  of their inputs. Statistics are generally available  for cash crops because farmers record
the sale of their harvests when their output is either exported or processed in factories.  In the
case of food crops, however, traded production is often too small, making the availability of
statistics inconsistent. In general, supply elasticities  of food crops are low as can be inferred by
Krishna (1963) from his study on single crop supply elasticities. In another, more recent study,
Jaeger (1991) combined cross-section  and time-series  data for 43 SSA countries and assessed  the
responsiveness  of prices, policies, natural disasters, and rainfall on the supply of exports and food
crops.  Natural disaster was represented by the percentage of population affected by disasters,
rainfall was proxied with  the  residual from  estimating a  regression trend  line for  cereal
yields.25/ In the short run, annual export crops price response was found to be elastic (above
0.9),  and  export supply elasticities with respect to  the real  exchange rate for  annual crops
241  Most  of the litemturc  on supply  response  in SSA dcaling  with a single commodity  includes  non-price  factors
variables.  For  example,  Olii (1969), Adesimi  (1970), and Mnitha  (1970), (sec the note in Table  Al),  anong others,
include  a time trend  variable  to represent  eithcr  technology  or infrastructure,  or population:  the use of proxies  for the
weather  variable  are also common.  However, there are factors that  influence price responsiveness  which are not
considend  in these  models.  In particular,  the level of prices  received  by farmers  may  not be  as important  as  the timeliness
of their receipt, or the political  stability, or the rura  infrstructure.
25/ The use of this proxy  for rainfall  was based on the assumption  that for most  countries,  variations  in average  yields
will result primarily from  variations  in weather. Furthermore,  for  the regression  equation it is assumed that this proxy
is not corrclated  with the dependent  variable. But, if this proxy is a fiintion of the dependent  variabk, then the estimates
are  biased.34
exported  were found  to be about-0.6.  The possibilitythat  export  agriculture  may  crowd  out  food
production  was examined. It appears  that growth  in agriculture  exports  is not at the expense  of-
food production. Food production  is positively  correlated  with export crop prices and real
exchange  rates, suggesting  complementarity.
AGGREGATE  SuPPLY  ELASTICrnES.  Even when individual  crop-supply  response  is
strong, it does not eliminate  the ambiguity  of the aggregate  agriculture  supply  response. If the
aggregate  elasticity  is low, then export crops may increase  at the expense of food crops.
Econometric  evidence  confirms  that the elasticity  of aggregate  agricultural  response  is positive,
so cash crops are not obtained  at the expense  of food crops.  However,  there is little  reliable  or
robust  data estimating  aggregate  agricultural  supply  response  for SSA countries. This limited
evidence is presented in Table A3 and is drawn from Bond (1983), and Berthelemy  and
Morrisson  (1989). In Table  6 Chhibber  (1988)  provides  data  on available  estimates  for long-run
elasticities  for developing  countries  derived  from at least four types  of models. These models
include cross-country,  cross-section  (farm  households),  inter-sectoral  general equilibrium,  and
time-series. In general,  the first two models  produced  relatively  high estimates  of elasticities.
(Cavallo  and Mundlak  (1982),  and Peterson  (1988)). Cross-section  models  give lower  values,
yet they  suffer from the unreliability  of farm-level  price data. Time-series  models  rely directly
or indirectly  on the Nerlovian  (1958)  dynamics-of-supply  model.
As noted by Chhibber  (1991),  elasticities  of aggregate  supply  response  m agriculture
in SSA countries  seems  to be comparable  to those  in other  parts of the developing  world. One
important  paper written  by Pritchett (1992)  must be taken into account  when considering  the
effects  of a tradeables  supply  response.  Pritchett  shows  that in an economy  subject  to foreign
exchange  rationing,  like many  economies  in SSA, a real depreciation  will affect  exports  in the
"normal"  sense, but imports  may exhibit  a perverse  response. If the flow of total imports  is
constrained  by the availability  of foreign  exchange,  a real depreciation  will have  two conflicting
effects:  on the one hand, it will increase  the price of imported  goods, and on the other  hand, it
will increase  the export  receipts  and, through  this channel,  induce  higher demand  for imports.
Empirical  evidence  provided  by Moran  (1988)  and  Faini et al. (1992)  indicates  that  the effect  on
imports  can be quite  strong  and  therefore  account  for the overall  low  responsiveness  of the trade35
balance and output.  Additional supporting evidence is provided by Faini (1991) for six less
developed countries (among them, Kenya, Malawi, and Zambia).
Table  6: Long-run Estimates of Aggregate Agricultural Supply Elasticity in Developing
Countries
Model  Range  of Estirnates
Cross-farm  (-0.02)  - 0.15
Time-series  0.13  - 0.78
Inter-sectoral general equilibrium  0.09
Cross-country  1.27  - 1.66
Source: Chhibber,  (1988)  p. 10.
THE  FALLACY  OF  COMPOSITON  ARGUMENT.
The fallacy  of composition presumes  that  markets  would  not  be  -able  to absorb  all of the exports
that would materialize  if developing  countries"  jointly promoted  an export-led  strategy (for
example,  by a series  of devaluations).  Furthermore,  if such markets  were found, "they  would
be closed  by protectionist  measures,  provoked  by the import  penetration  and  outcries  of market
disruption"  (Bhagwati,  1988). The  fallacy  of composition  argument  takes  account  of the concept
of aggregate  demand  behavior. In other  words,  it does  not assume  that countries  are small  and
therefore  international  prices  are fixed. Effectiveness  of a devaluation  in improving  the external
balance  depends  on the behavior  of international  competitors.  It is often argued  that, if a wide
range of developing  countries-commodity-exporter  countries-devalued  their currencies  to
increase  the volume  of their exports,  the consequent  expansion  in the world  commodities  supply
would  deteriorate  the country's  terms  of trade. A recent  paper  by Faini  et a].  (1992)  argues  that
the so-called  fallacy  composition  argument  applies  to manufacturing  products  (in developing
countries)  as well. Can it therefore  be inferred  that  the fallacy  composition  argument  is relevant
to SSA  countries  (and to various  sectors  in SSA)?36
Agricultural exports from SSA are concentrated in a few products.2w The share in
world exports of these commodities is generally low, with the exception of coffee, tea, cotton,
sisal, groundnut oil and tobacco (Table 7.)  Also, SSA economies are generally vulnerable to
world prices.
Several studies have been recently done  to  empirically shed light on the debate.
Akiyama and Larson (1993) estimated the elasticity of export revenue with respect to export
volume for the main primary commodity exports of the region.  Their results show that cocoa
is the only commodity for which increases in export volume causes export revenue to fall.  All
other commodities - coffee, sugar,  tea, vegetable oils, cotton,  tobacco, sisal, oranges,  and
pineapples have positive elasticities which  means that  increases in export volumes lead to
increases in export revenues.  Investigating  the cotton market, Coleman and Thigpen conclude
that an adding-up problem does not exist for cotton.  In another study done by the World Bank
(1993), a comparison of the effects on export earnings of a 5 percent increase in total African
exports of cocoa, coffee and tea revealed that only for cocoa, and that too in the short-run, does
Africa face the "fallacy  of composition".  Coleman, Akiyaman and Varangis (1993) studied the
effects of structural adjustment programs in Sub-Saharan Africa on the cocoa sector using a
global econometric model. They focussed on Ghana and Nigeria that are major cocoa producers
that undertook structural adjustment  programns.  They find that  the impact on world cocoa prices
was relatively small.  In examining nine cocoa-producing  countries, Panagariya and Sciff (1991)
showed that a depreciation can lead, in the short run, to lower combined export revenues for all
cocoa producers with some winners and some losers.  In the long run, the impact is positive but
small.
It is concluded that simultaneous devaluation  by several SSA countries is unlikely to
sufficiently reduce world commodity prices, and thus to reduce their total export earnings.z7/
The one possible exception is cocoa producers, "who would face a temporary decline in the short
run" (DeRosa and Greene, 1991).
26/ In contnmst,  the products  contributing  to import  eanLings  am much  less concentratod.
27/ Chhibber  (1991)  shows evidence  of the fallacy  composition  argumcnt,  but swacs  that  asticities  am such  that  export
revenues will increase in spite of the argument.37
Table 7:  Export Values and Shares of World Exports for Selected Agricultural
Commodities Elasticity in SSA Countries (US$ millions, I%)
1980  1991
Product  Export Value  Percent  of &ports  Erport Value  Peircent  of Exports
Cocoa Beans  2055.3  72.5  1410.0  67.2
Pabn Oil  79.B  3.9  74.0  2.7
SIsal  63.4  48.4  18.6  40.4
Coffee  2794.4  22.4  1137.0  15.0
Groundnut
Oil  89  23.9  92.3  31.9
Tea  281.6  14.0  385.4  15.5
Coffton  1170.6  15.0  937.8  11.1
Tobacco  339  8.9  837.3  14.6
Groundnut  79.5  15.0  22.7  2.7
Souse:  UNCTAD  Ycabook. (1987 and 1993)38
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Empirical Evidence  from Sub-Saharan  Africa
This chapter addresses three empirical questions.  One, is to investigate the long-run effects of
nominal devaluations on the real exchange rates.  Two, is to test the effects of real depreciations
on per capita real GDP growth in the transitional  period to steady-state. Three, is to analyze the
causal relationships and the directions of causality between nominal devaluations and money
growth, and between real devaluations  and real exports growth.2s;
In  a  sample of twenty-two SSA countries29r during the period  1971-1991, we  find  a
statistically  significant  long-run relationship  between  nominal devaluations  and real depreciations.
We find real depreciations to have a neutril effect on real per capita GDP growth.  Further, we
find significant  causal relationships that run from money  growth to inflation, from output growth
to inflation, from inflation  to nominal devaluations,  and from inflation  to money  growth. Finally,
we cannot find any causal relationship between real depreciations and real exports growth.
A. Real and Nominal Devaluations Dynamic
It  is  commonly believed that  economic policy  weaknesses in  general  and- expansionary
macroeconomic policies in particular are responsible for  the poor economic growth in the
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) during the past two decades. It has been argued that one
of the channels through which growth can be hurt the most is through the decline of the extemal
28/  Causality  is in the framework  of Granger-Causality  (Granger,  1969  and 1980).
29/ The  countries  are Benin,  Botswana,  Ivory  Cost, Cameroon,  Congo,  Gabon,  Ghana,  Gambia,  Kenya,
Lesotho,  Madagascar,  Mali, Mauritania,  Mauritius,  Malawi,  Niger, Nigeria,  Rwanda,  Senegal,  Togo,
Zaire, and the Zambia. The choice  of this sample  is dictated  by the availability  of the data.39
competitiveness  caused by overvaluation of the real exchange rate (RER).2w Given the need
to correct overvaluation  in the RER, and hence to improve external competitiveness  and resume
growth in the region, many countries in the region devalued  their currencies in the 1980s.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the effectiveness  of nominal devaluations in
inducing  permanent real depreciations  of the RER in SSA.  Using regression analysis, Edwards
(1988)  has shown that nominal  devaluations  are effective  in bringing about  real depreciations  for
a diverse group of developing countries.  In a theoretical  paper Khan and Lizondo (1987) have
shown that the effectiveness  of nominal devaluations on the RER in the long run depends on
supporting restrictive fiscal measures  (and by implication  monetary measures)  to accompany  the
devaluations.31y  An implicadton  is that when analyzing the effectiveness  of devaluations on the
RER, the effects  of monetary  and  fiscal policies  have  to be accounted  for.
Theoretical  and Empirical Considerations.
The analytical  framework used is an extension of Meltzer (1993). Let the actual RER has both
permanent  and transitory components  given by:
R  RR=RERP  +Ut,  (1)
where RERP, is the permanent component and U 1 is the transitory disturbance component.
Furthermore, the current permanent  value is a weighted  average of the last period's RER and any
persistent effect of fiscal and monetary policies. Let F, be a vector that consists of fiscal deficits
and real money balances. Then the RERP is given by:
RERP  =PRERt- 1 + (  - P)F  +  vt  (2)
Combining equations (1) and (2) gives:
where et is an error term.
30/ Ghura  and Grennes  (1993) have shown  that the RER  was cvervalued  in several countries of the region
during  the  period 1970-1987, and  that  macroeconomic performance  was  adversely affected by
overvaluation.  See also the papers  by Agarwala  (1989, Edwards  (1989 and Cottani  et al. (1990)  for
empirical  evidence of  the deleterious effects of the  overvalued real exchange rates on  economuc
performance.
31/  See also the papers by Berglas and Razin  (1973) and Edwards  (1989).40
- ~~RER  =ARER  _+(I-P).F  +et  t3)
Let the real money  balances  be M/P, where  M is the stock  of money  and P is the price
level. To separate  the effects  of prices  from the effects  of money  on the RER, Meltzer  (1993)
totally  differentiates  the real money  stock  to obtain:
AM.tAP%t  4 ffi  ~~A  ( M)  =  Mt; _ - e (  M  )(,
Pt  pt- 1 pt-_1 Pt-
The first term in equation  (4) is the real value (expressed  in past prices)  of the current change
in nominal  money  balances. The second  term is  the revenue  from  the inflation  tax on real money
balances. The inflation  tax captures  the fiscal  implication  of monetary  policy. Taking  the first
difference  of equation  (3) and substituting  A(M/P),  by the expression  in equation  (4) gives:
ARER,=PARER,- 1 -(l-))  ('-  P  t
pt-1  t-1
The RER  is measured  as (S  .P)/P, where  S is the  spot  nominal  exchange  rate, defined
as the bome  currency  price  of the U.S. dollar,  P is the domestic  GDP  deflator,  and  P is the U.S.
wholesale  price index. To estimate  the effects  of nominal  devaluations  on the change  in the RER,
equation  5 is augmented  by the contemporaneous  and k lags of a variable  measuring  nominal
devaluation  (NDEV). NDEV  is defined  as the percentage  change  in the nominal  exchange  rate.
We also include  the expected  change  in the cost  of holding  money,  r, as an additional  explanatory
variable  to capture  the effects  of real interest  rates  on the change  in the RER. This variable  is
measured  as the A(inflationX  ,, where  inflation  is the rate  of growth  of the GDP  deflator  defined
as the percentage  change  of the price level,  P.  We do not have  a complete  time series  for the
deficits,  therefore  we do not include  them  in the regression. This yields  the following  equation
that we test:
ARE22t  bo+6l^iERt-1+Yi(tZD  t-i+62(  p  t)  +83(  p  t*(  p  t  )  -6r+qt-.
:1=0  - t-2  -t-1  st-i
(6)41
Empirical Results.
The number  of lags k is determined  by two methods-the  Akaike  (1974)  Information  Criterion  Statistic
(AIC), and Hall's (1992)  General-to  Specific  method,  where  a general lag structure  is fitted  (4 in this
paper) and an F test is used to test backward.L2y  The optimal  lag length k is found to be three.
Equation  (6) was estimated  by OLS  for twenty  countries  over the period 1971-1991-  with  pooled  time-
series  and cross-section  data.33L  The regression  is tested and corrected  for hetroskedasticity.4/  The
results  are:
ARERt= 0.05A(RER), 1 +0.88(NDEV), -0.05(NDEV) 1 .1 - 0.05(NDEV),. 2 -0.04(NDEV) 1.,
(1.34)  (44.61)*  (-1.42)  (-2.31)'  (-2.358)*
-0.03(ZNFTAX)  -0.Ol(QMtP1 ,J) + 0.02(rJ.
(-24.66)'  (-1.50)  (0.62)
R 2 =  0.88  F=  295.9{T N=339.
The t ratios are in parentheses. The estimated  coefficient  on ARER. 1 is significantly  different  which
indicates  that  there  is no significant  persistent  in real  devaluations.  The estimated  coefficient  'yb  gives  the
contemporaneous  relationship  between  nominal  devaluation  and real depreciations  and is equal  to 0.88.
It is found to be statistically  significant  at the 5 percent  level. This coefficient  implies  that a 10 percent
noniinal  devaluation  at time t yields  about  8.8 percent  real depreciation  at time t, other things  remain
unchanged  The other estimated coefficients  71,  y7,  and 73  are all negative (-0.05, -0.05, and -0.04,
respectively)  and (with the exception  of y,) statistically  significant  at the 5 percent level.  Their
magnitudes,  however,  are very small. We test the null hypothesis  that the sum  of all contemporaneous
and  lagged  nominal  devaluation  terms  is equal  to zero, (H:  li-.  oy  y=0).  The F value is found  to be
32/  We test for the significance  of the fourth lag, then the fourth and the third, the fourth, third, and the
second, and finally, all four lags together.
331 The list of countries included  in the sample are in footnote  2 except for Rwanda  and Lesotho, where
complete time series data cannot be found.
34!  The Breusch-Pagan  and the White tests are used to test for hetroskedasticity. The correction is
accomplished  by scaling all variables including the intewrept  and instnuments  in the regression by the
estimated  standard deviations of the residuals  for each country.42
584.2, which leads to the rejection of the null at the 5 percent level. This implies  that there exists a long-
run effect of nominal devaluations  on the real exchange rate.  The sum of the coefficients iiI48  (i = 1,
2, 3) gives the long-run impact, and is computed to be 0.77.  This implies that a  10 percent nominal
devaluation at time t gives a 7.7 percent real depreciation in the long run, holding all other things equal.
The estimated coefficient on the inflation tax (-0.03) is statistically different from zero at the
5 percent level.  The negative sign implies  that the inflation tax that results from expansionary monetary
policies results in an appreciation of the real exchange rate.  A 10 percentage  points increase in inflation
tax leads to a 0.3 percentage points appreciation  of the real exchange rate.  The estimated coefficient  on
the real money supply is also negative but statistically  insignificant  at the 5 percent level.  The proxy for
the real interest rate is statistically insignificant  at the 5 percent level.
B. Real Depreciations and Real Economic Growth
There is a general agreement about the extent of poor growth performance  of most SSA countries. Data
of sixteen out of twenty-two  countries in the sample show a poor economic  growth in the 1980s  compared
to that in the 1970s  (see table A7).  Fifteen countries have experienced  negative growth rates during the
period 1981-1991.  There  are  both exogenous and endogenous explanatory factors for  this  poor
performance. Among the endogenous  factors are the distorted macroeconomic  policies pursued by many
countries. To improve the performance  of their economies, many African countries  embarked on policy
reforms with the support of the  Bank and the IMF.  Most of the reform programs adopted included
devaluations  as a policy variable. The question  addressed here is h3w do real devaluations  have affected
GDP growth?  The next section focuses on deriving a theoretical model, where real depreciation of the
exchange rate is an additional argument in the growth function.
The Theoretical Approach.
Devaluations  of domestic currency give a signal to producers about the authority's intention  for openness.
If devaluations induce real depreciations then producers have the incentive to produce more goods.
Therefbre, we can think of real devaluations  as a factor affecting productivity. On the other hand, real
devaluations raise the price of importable goods (and their substitutes), which generates inflation and
discourage imports.  The increase in the price of importable goods generates inflation  -and inflation
expectations,  which have negative impact on real output growth because it reduces the efficiency of the43
price system.  Thus, inflation distorts the allocation of resources decisions.35/  Bruno (1979) and Van
Wijnbergen  (1986)  argue that in countries  where factor inputs are imported, a currency devaluation  results
in an increase in production costs, hence, lowers output.  Theoretically, it is not clear what would the
effect of real devaluations  be on real output. Edwards (1986) showed  that real depreciations  have neutral
effect on real output.
The traditional neoclassical  growth model (Solow, 1956) explains changes in the steady-state
level of real income per capita as a function of changes in savings rates,  population growth rates and
total factor  productivity (level of  technology).  Recent growth literature treats technology as  an
endogenous  variable (Barro (1991) and Lucas (1988)). Capital is assumed of two parts, physical capital
and human capital.  Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1990) introduced a  model, where human capital
accumulation  enters as an additional  argument in the Solow model. Using this model, we argue that real
devaluations  can affect total factor productivity. We test the null hypothesis Ho: real devaluations  have
zero effect on per capita real output growth against the alternative  HI: real devaluations  have non-zero
effect  -on per capita real output growth.
We follow Mankiw, Romer and Weil by assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function.
Production at time t is given by:
rw'=rnSP  ( zL)'1  F  (7)
O<ua<1  ,etC+j<3,
where Y is output, K is physical capital stock, H is human capital, L is labor, and Z is the level of
technology.  The parameters a  and  B are the shares  of physical and  human capitals in  income
respectively. Labor is assumed to grow exogenously  at a rate n:
L,=L,enr  - . - (8).
The level of technology is assumed to grow exogenously  at a rate g.  In this paper we also assume that
the level of technology is affected by the real exchange  rates, R.
Z,=zoeVtf  (R)  i  (9)
To simplify things, we assume a simple functional  form for f(.):
35/ For further  discussion  about  the negative  impact  of inflation  on economic  growth  see for example,
Cecchetti (1986), Leijonhufvud (1980), Friedman (1986), Carlton (1982), Parks (1987), and Fischer
(1993).44
ZCZeUZ  RtD  (10)
where the elasticities ot technology with respect to the real exchange rate is 0.  In the next section, we
test Ho  with respect to 0.
Let k be defined as the stock of capital per effective unit of labor (k= K/ZL).  Let h be defined
as the stock of human capital per effective unit of labor (h=H/ZL).  Let y be defined as the level of real
output per effective unit of labor (y=Y/ZL).  The fraction of real income spent on physical capital is Sk
and that spent on human capital is Sh. The physical and human capital stocks evolve according to:
iC-S,-  (n+g+O)  k
h=Sh-  (n+g+8)h,
where it is assumed that both types of capital depreciate at a rate 6.  The steady-state  is defined when both
types of capital are constant in efficiency  units.  Note that the retums on the two types of capital are not
the same in die steady-state  because the savings rates are assumed exogenous.  The equilibrium values
of physical and human capital stocks are k' and h' and given by:-




The equilibrium level of real output per effective unit of labor is y:
Y* =ST  S+  (n+g+5)  (ng  (13)
The output per  effective unit of  labor is a  function of  investment in  physical and human capital,.
population growth, and technology. The natural logarithm  of real output per capita (Y/L) is given by:
ln(-9)  =ln,+  1nS.+  Inst  -__  I_n(n+g+b)  _14)
where the level of technology is given by:
inz;=  lnZ 0+g,OlnRt  (15)
The empirical equation is:45
ln{Y/L)  C-constant+allnSk+a2InSh+a3ln(n+g+6)  .a 41nR,.  (16)
Now let us assume that real output per capita grows at a speed X  to the steady-state. This gives:
.dln yA1Z .A(in(X))  .ln(  )1  g  (17)
dt  L 
where (Y/L)  is the equilibrium (steady-state)  path of real output per capita defined above, and X is the
speed of convergence  to the steady-state  level of YIL.  One solution  to this differential equation is:
In  YIL) c-lni(YIL)  c-  (1  (-  eX  `9A+  U -e  -1')  In  (YIL)  1-n(Y/IL) c l,  (B
which describes the growth path of real output per capita between two points in time.  This yields the
following  equation:
Aln(Y/L)  t=cons.  +b,JlnSk+ blnS,+b 31n(n+g+6)  +b,ln(Y/L) 0 b5A1nR  +eC.  (19)
The change of the real exchange is an endogenous  variable.  Modeling  the real exchange for
SSA countries is a difficult matter, therefore, we will not do so.  Instead, we will treat the depreciation
term  AR,  by decomposing  the real exchange rate into the change of the real exchange rate measured at
past prices and an inflationary part.  The real exchange rate, R, is defined as (S.PW)L6.  Totally
differentiating  yields:
AR~  =x  (Sp*)  AP  SP  (20)
&-i  Pc-.  Pr-i
The first term is the change of real exchange  rate at past prices, and the second term is inflation times
the real exchange  rate itself.  Because  we are measuring changes in the real exchange  rate at past prices,
we will assume that these changes are exogenous. Substituting  equation (20) in equation (19) yields  the
following  equation:
36/ The real  exchange  rate, R is defined  as the  ratio  of the  price  of traded  goods  to the price  of the  non-
traded  goods.  The spot exchange rat,  S is defined  as the domestic  cunrency  price of the U.S. dollar.  P"
is the price of traded goods approximated  by the wholesale  price index of the United  States, WPII
(1987  =  100). P is the  domestic  price  of non-traded  goods  approximated  by the  GNP  deflator  (1987  =100).
Real exchange  rate = In [(S.WPIu)1GNP  deflatore 1 )  where  i is a country  index. The real devaluation
variable  is the  first difference  of the real exchange  rate. R is A real exchange  rate.46
Aln(Y/L)  nb 11nSk+b 21nS4+b)1n(n+g+8)  +b41n(Y/L)+bs  [Aln(ALp)J  -be  (x.  1n(-  p)]  +et.  (21)
PC--  P- 1
The restrictions  implied  by the model  are given  by:
ba-(1- 4 )lnzo  (ln)  (e++)Pro.  (22).
M  >0.  (23)
b2  (1-e^  1  )O  24)
.3<0
b3 2-  (1-e  (')  «CO  (25)
b-4-  {-e 1 )  c0.  (26)
b5u  (il-e  t)l  >o  (27)
16=  (le-kc)O( 2<0,
The model implies that the growth rate of per capita real output depends  positively  on
investment  rates for physical  and human  capital,  negatively  on population  growth,  positively  on changes
in the real exchange  rate at  past prices and negatively  on the inflation resulting from nominal
devaluations.
Estimation  and the Results.
We estimated  equation  (21)  via 2SLS  using  pooled  time-series  and  cross-section  annual  data  for the  period
1971-1991  for 22 SSA  countries. We assumed  that  investment/GDP  and  human  capital  are endogenous47
Table 8: 2SLS  Instrumental  Variables  Results  for the Augmented  Mankiw,  Romer  and Weil Model  with
Pooled  Time-Series  and Cross-Section  Data  for 1971-1991.
Unrcstrcted Model  Rcstricted Model  Unrcstricted Modcl  Restricted  Model
Indepcudcnt Vaibles  Depcndent  Variabic RaLe  of Growth of Real CDP per Capita
In Y0 0.0004  0.00003  -0.0006  0.00007
(0.560)  (0.957)  (-0.659)  (0.088)
In (U/GDP) 1 0.024  0.024  0.026  0.016
(3.729)*  (3.621)*  (2.885)*  (2.1298)
In (Life cxp.),  0.015  0.010  0.028  0.007
(3.061)*  .295)"  (2.569)*  (1.062)
-0.88  -0.034  -1.75  -0.024
(n+g+6).  (-2.088)*  (-3.428)*  (-2.744)*  (-1.766)#
Aln[(SP)/Po 1]  0.047  0.016
(0.468)  (0.162)
-.  ln[(SPY)/P,.  -0.035  -0.027
(-2.315)*  (-2.541)*
i2  .0.0342  0.0329  0.0583  0.Q402
F  4.508  4.454  3.805  3.097
P-value  0.0014  0.0043  0.0011  0.0094
N  396  396  375  375
An Asterisk denotes statistically  significant at the 5 pernent levcl. The symbol V denotes statistically
significalit at the ten percmt level.  Numbers in parentheses  are t-ratios.  Instrumental  variables are lagged
values and  all othcr exogenous  variables in the model.48
variables.aZ/  We used population  growth  instead  of the variable  (n+g+6)  because  we do not
know  the depreciation  rates  and  the rate of growth  of technological  progress  that  satisfy  the SSA
countries3s8.  All regressions  are corrected  for hetroskedasticity  by scaling  all variables  and
the instruments  by the estimated  standard deviations  of country specific residuals.3i -The
results  are reported  in table 8.
The first regression  is the growth model  in the unrestricted  form.  All variables  are
found  to be statistically  significant  at the 5 percent  level and bear the expected  signs  except  for
initial  income  (1971  income  measured  in U.S. dollar). This estimated  coefficient  is found to be
statistically  not different  from zero at the 5 percent  level.40/
The second regression  is  the basic Mankiw, Romer and Weil model with the
restrictions  that b,  +b2+b,=O imposed. We tested  the restriction  and found it to hold on the 10
percent  level  only.
The third regression  is the unrestricted  augmented  growth model.  Again, most
variables  are found to be statistically  significantly  different  from zero at the 5 percent level.
Initial income  is fbund to be insignificant  at the 5 percent  level. The estimated  coefficient  on
AIn[(SP)/P 1 . 1J  is found  to be positive  but statistically  insignificant.  The term that includes  the
domestic  inflation  rates [r. In (SP/Pt.)J]  is found to be negative  as expected  and statistically
significant. This is interpreted  as a negative  effect  of inflation  on per capita  real GDP growth
in the transition  to the steady-state  (Fischer,  1993).  We testtd the restriction  b5+b6=O  and found
it to hold at the 5 percent  level. Thus, when  we control  for effect  of inflation,  real depreciations
have  neutral  effect  on real  per capita  growth  rates in the transitional  period. Note  that the fiscal
37/ We measure human capital by the variable life expectancy  at birth.  This measurement  is not the best
measurement  but we use it because  data are readily available in World Tables.  A better measurement  can
be life expectancy  for population 16-55 years of age.  This latter variable is not available.  For example,
Barro and Lee (1993) use enrollment  ratiDs at the primary  and secondary school levels  to measure  human
capital.  Life expectancy at birth is usually assumed to be an endogenous variable and a  function of
education and health.  We cannot find complete time series for 1971-1991  for these two variables.  The
instruments used in the regressioas are simply lagged values.
38/  Tha term (n+g+6)  is traditionally  treated in the literature by assuming some values for g and
B such that (n+g+5)  is equal to In (n+.05).
39/  Two tests for homoskedasticity  are used.  The Breush-Pagan  test and the White test.
40/  We do not test for convergence. We follow Friedman (1992) argument that testing for convergence
in growth model is in fact a regression fallacy.49
and monetary  policies  variables  are not  controlled  for by the model. This makes  it very difficult
to isolate  the effects  of real depreciations  on the growth  rate of per capita  income.
The fourth  regression  is the restricted  augmented  growth  model. The restriction  are
found to be statistically  insignificant  at the 5 percent level.  However,  we cannot reject the
restriction  that b,+b6=0.  We estimate  the implied  shares  of physical  and human  capital  a and
£ iht  the restricted  regressions  (the  second  and  the fourth)  to be 0.023,  and 0.0096  and  0.015 and
0.0068 respectively. These estimates  suggest  that there are variables  other than physical  and
human  capital  that could  be important  in determining  the growth  rate in SSA.41/
C. Inflation, Money Growth, Output Growth, and Devaluations:  A Causality  Test
NTe Granger-Causaliy Model
The relationship  between  inflation,  money  growth,  and income  can be derived  from the following
exchange  equation:
2 + Yr.M+V,  (28)
where  P is the natural  logarithm  of the price  level,  Y is the natural  logarithm  of real output,  M
is the natural  logarithm  of money  stock,  and  V is the natural  logarithm  of the velocity  of money.
This identity  can be rearranged  such  that
APje 2AM(a 2 AYt 3 AIt,  (29)
which  is an inflation  equation,  where  money  growth  is  positively  correlated  with  inflation,  income
growth  is countercyclical  for a given  rate of money  growth,  and the interest rate is positively
41/  We also estimated  a  regression equation  with additional  lagged changes of real exchange  rates. We
tested  the restriction  that the sum of the lagged terms is equal to zero. We cannot reject the restriction that
all  lagged changes of  the real exchange rate sum to zero  at  the 5 percent level.  Therefore, real
depreciations  have neutral effect on growth.  The estimated  coefficients an not reported.50
correlated with inflation. The coefficients  ot, et., and a3 can be estimated and the hypothesis  that
these coefficients are significantly  not different from one can be tested empirically.4z/
Instead of estimating the model above, we will focus on the causal relationships
between these variables and nominal devaluations.  The idea is to determine the direction of
causality and what are the policy implications  of such findings.  For example, if money growth
causes inflation  then the policy lesson is clear; a tighter monetary policy may be required.  The
interesting question  is  about  the  causality direction  between  devaluations-inflation and
devaluations-money  growth.
Mhe  analysis is based on Granger's (1969)  causal model and Alvi and Islam (1989) who
implement the test for time series-cross sectional  data.
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where  all variables  are in natural  logarithms,  therefore,  rate  of growth  of pric  es (inflation),  rate
of growth of money stock, rate of growth of output, and rate of growth of nominal exchange rate
(devaluations), which is defined as the percentage change of the nominal exchange rate.  All
variables in the system are stationary  time series.  The error terms are uncorrelated. The idea
is to conduct a series of F tests on all the coefficients in the Vector Auto-Regressive (VAR)
system to test the nuill  hypotheses that the sum of each of the coefficients is equal to zero.  For
example, if the sum of the coefficients  b is statistically  different from zero, then we say money
growth Granger-causes inflation.  It is important to carefully determine the number of lags,
k.43/ The number of lags here is set equal to four.
42/  The other model  for inflation is the structurlist model. This model emerged  in Latin  America in the
1950s as an alternative to the monetary model  above.  The model emphasizes  bottlenecks  that accompany
development  processes as determinants of inflation.  Thus, inflation is a finiction  of sectoral impasses  or
constraints.
43/  We use the Akaike (1974) Information  Criterion (AIC) and Hall's (1992) general-to-specific  method
to determine the optimal lag length.  We fit a general lag structure (4 lags) and use an F-test to test
backward  and eliminate  all unnecessary  lags.51
Estiation  and Results
The results  are reported  in table  9. We find  a statistically  significant  causal  relationships  between
money  growth  and inflation  that run in both directions. Thus, Money  growth  Granger-causes
inflation  and  inflation  Granger-causes  money  growth. This result  needs  no further  explanations.-
We also find that output growth Granger-causes  inflation  and that inflation  Granger-causes
devaluations.  No  causality  is  detected  between  money  growth  and real  output,  money  growth  and
devaluations,  and output  and  devaluations.
D. Real Exports Growth,  Output  Growth,  and Real Devaluations:
A Causality Test
The objective of this section is to examine the causal relationship  between real exports
and-real devaluations in Sub-Saharan  Africa.  Real devaluations  are defined here as the
percentage changes of the real exchange  rate that are equal to or greater than 15 percent.
This cutoff point was used by Edwards.44;  We apply the Granger-Causality (1969)
test  to  pooled  time-series  and  cross-section  data  for  19  Sub-Saharan  African
countries45/  for the period 1971-1991. Among these countries, there are i3  that have
gone through major devaluation episodes  during the 1980s as defined above.46!
44  We have also tested  the model  without  any cutoff  point  and found  similar  results.
45/  The countries are chosen because  we have complete  time-series for all variables. These countries are
Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroon,  Congo, Gabon, Ghana, Gambia,  Kenya,  Madagascar,  Mali, Mauritania,
Mauritius, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo, Zaire, and Zambia.
46/  Countries that implemented devaluation policies are Botswana, Ghana, Gambia, Kenya, Lesotho,
Madagascar,  Mauritania, Mauritius, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda, Zaire, and Zambia.52
Table  9.  Summary of  Causal inferences  for Twenty SSA countries,  1971-1991.
Null Hypothesis  Devaluation=N_D  Causal inference
EV
1. AM does not cause AP  F=7.2073  Inflation  Money Growth
(0.0077)*:
2. AP does not cause AM  F=21.  1425  Money Growth -*  Inflation
(0.0001)*
3.AY does not cause AP  F=8.2025  Income Growth  Inflation
(0.0045)*
4.AP does not cause AY  F=0.7295  No causality
(0.3937)
5.Devaluation does not cause AP  F=0.4888  No causality
(0.4850)
6.AP does not cause devaluations  F= 16.3632  Inflation  Devaluation
(0.0001)*
7.AM does not cause AY  F= 1.0408  No causality
(0.3084)
8.AY does not cause AM  F=0.0400  No causality
(0.8416)
9.AY does not cause devaluations  F=2.6637  No causality
(0.1037)
10.Devaluation  does not cause  F=0.0031  No causality
AY  (0.9557)
1L1AM  does not cause  IF=0.1293  No causality
devaluations  (0.7195)
12.Devaluation  does not cause  F=0.2077  No causality
AM  (0.6489)
Statistically  significant at the 5% level.
# Statistically significant  at the 10% level.
P-values in parentheses.
Number of observations is 302.  All variables are in natural logarithms; so Ain is the rate of
growth.53
Methodology  and  the data
Nelson and Schwert (1982), and Geweke, Meese and Dent (1983) argue that the OLS version of
the Granger test is more powerful than most of the other procedures, for example, Sims (1972).
The Granger procedure can be described by the following system,
&Xt-ae + E ap&tXr1  +  jZ  bjARt_j  + E Cj&P,_.1  +  e,,  (31)
k  k
AX,,-a 0t  faAX.  bARC-  Eg  1 x:+  E  c. 1A&Pr_.e v,  (31)
APt=i 0+ E  j1A Pt- 1 + S  1AX.j  l E  m  &Re-,+u ,t-  (33)
Where, X is the real export growth defined as the first difference of the natural logarithm of the
real exports measured in domestic currency. Inflation, P is defined as the first difference of the
natural logarithm of the GNP deflator. R is the real exhange rate which is the ratio of traded
goods price level to non-traded goods price level. This variable is measured  by S.Pf/P as defined
earlier.  And AX,, A&, and AP, are stationary time series and e1, v,, and ut are uncorrelated error
terms that retain the classical regression assumptions. Unidirectional causality from AR to AX
or from AX to AR requires that at least some bj's and gi's to be significandy different from zero.
The same condition is required for causality from AP to AX (some c1's ￿0)  or from AX to AP
(some l,'s￿  O), from AP to AR (some Ig's￿0 0) and from AR to AP (some rn;'s￿; O). Bidirectional
causality in the order above implies that b 1 ￿0,  g 1 0,  X4￿0,  I;￿0,  h;￿0,  and mn;dO  for at least
some i's.  Of course, if AR, AX, and AP are causally independent, all the coefficients  of AR in
equations (31) and (33) and of AX in equations (32) and (33) and of AP in equations (31) and
(32) should be statistically insignificant.
The  time series X,  R,  and P are nonstationary.  These series are tested by  the
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (1984).47/ All series are first differenced and checked for unit
47/  Test statistics  are not reported.  For all variables,  we tested  the null hypothesis  that p=O in the
following  regression  equation:
A R 1, = Bo  + pR,. 1 +  Di-jai A RF;  + A* R is X, R, and P respectively.  Critical  values  are in Dickey-
Fuller  (1979).54
root again. Tle optimal number of lags, k in equations (31), (32), and (33) is determined by two
methods:  the Akaike (1974) Information Criterion (AIC) and by fitting a general lag structure
and  test  backward  using  F-test.4st  The  standard  F-Statistics  are  used  to  test  the  joint
significance of the corresponding lag coefficients.
The exports supply relationship captures the relationships between real exports, the
real price of exportable goods measured by the real exchange rate, and the cost of production at
the home country measured by the home inflation rates.  All regressions are corrected for
hetroskedasticity using the estimated standard deviations for each country to scale the variables
in the regressions including the constants.
Empirical  Results
We test the following six hypotheses:
- real devaluations (AR) does not Granger-Causes real export Growth (AX);
- real export Growth (AX) does not Granger-Causes real devaluations (AR);
- inflation (AP) does not Granger-Causes real export growth (AX);
- real export (AX) does not Granger-Causes Inflation (AP);
- real devaluations (AR) does not Granger-Causes inflation (AP); and
- inflation (AP) does not Granger-Causes real devaluations (AR).
Table 10 presents summary results of the above causality  tests.  Estimates  of F-statistics
and their P-values are reported in column 2.  A causal inference is reported in column 3 where
an arrow indicates  the direction of significant  causality. On the basis of these statistics, it is clear
that there is no support for any causal link between real export growth and real devaluations.
Statistical inferences indicate that real devaluations do not cause real  exports growth.  The
absence of any significant causal relationships between real devaluations and real exports growth
can be due to the omission of an independent  factor that jointly influences real exports growti
and real devaluations.
4SI Sephton (1989) suggests that inappropriate  lag structure could result in misleading  causal relationship.
The General-to-Specific  method is described in Hall (1992).55
Table 10. Summary  of Causal  inferences  for 19  SSA  countries,  1971-1991.
Real devaluations=  %A  Real  exchange  rate  Greater  than 15%
Null  Hypothesis  (1)  (2)
Causal  inference
1. Real Devaluation  does not cause  Real export  Growth  F=0.7540  No Causality
(0.3861)
2. Real Export  Growth  does  not cause  Real evaluations  F=0.3795  No Causality
(0.5384)
3. Inflation  does  not cause  Real Export  Growth  F=0.5373  No Causality
(0.4643)
4. Real Export  Growth  does  not cause  Inflation  F=0.0217  No Causality
(0.8831)
5. Real  Devaluation  does not cause  Inflation  F=2.3995  No Causality
(0.  1227)
6. Inflation  does not cause  Real  Devaluations  F= 1.0202  No Causality
(0.3135)
P-values  in parentheses.
Number  of observations  is 286.
E. Condusions
Pooled  time-series  and cross-section  data  for 22 African  countries  covering  the period  1971-1991
are used  to test a number  of hypotheses.
First, we find that  nominal  devaluations  have  a long-mn  impact  on real  devaluations;
that  nominal  devaluations  have  significant  contemporaneous  relationship  with  real exchange  rate
devaluations;  and that there is a significant  long-run  relationship  between  the two forms of
devaluations.  A 10 percent  nominal  devaluation  at time t gives  a 7.7 percent  real depreciation.
in the long run.  We also show  that expansionary  monetary  policy  leads to appreciation  of the
real exchange  rate for this group of SSA countries. The data confirm  that devaluations  can
indeed  be an effective  policy  tool to correct  an overvalued  currency  if accompanied  by restrictive
monetary  and  fiscal  policies.56
Second,  the same  data are used to estimate  an augmented  Mankiw,  Romer  and Weil
model. We augmented  the model  with  real exchange  rate  depreciations  as factor affecting  total
output productivity. We find that depreciations  have neutral  effect on real output per capita
growth  rate in the transition  to steady-state.
Third,  we investigated  the causal  relationship  between,  inflation,  money  growth,  output
growth,  and devaluations. We find that money  growth  and real output  growth cause  inflation;
that inflation  causes money  growth and devaluations;  and that there is no significant  causal
relationship  that runs  from real exchange  rate depreciations  to real export  growth.
The above  results,  particularly  the effects  of real  exchange  rate  depreciations  on growth
and exports,  should  be interpreted  with caution  as fiscal policies  are not controlled  for in the
models.57
Appendix I
The following is a list of variables used in equations  (6), (21), (30) and (31) which are tested in
this paper:
g  :Growth rate of technology
INFTAX  :Inflation  tax defined as inflation  times real money  balances(M/P),.
I  :Real investment.
Life  :Life expectancy  at birth.
L  :Labor
M  :Money stock.
NDEV  :Nominal devaluation defined as the percentage change in the nominal  exchange
rate.
n  :Population growth rate
P  :The price of non-traded goods measured by the GDP deflator. In equations (31) to
(33), P represents rate of inflation  which is computed  by AIn  P,
P*  :The price of traded goods measured by the wholesale  price index (the US price index
is used as a proxy).
R:  Real Exchange  Rate (RER) defined as the ratio of the price of traded goods to the price
of the non traded goods.  The U.S. wholesale  price index is used as a proxy for the
price of traded goods.  The price of the non traded goods is the GDP deflator defined
above. In equations (31) to (33), R represents the rate of RER depreciation.
r  :Change in expected cost of holding domestic money as a proxy for interest rate is-
defined as the a  (inflation,, - inflation,), where inflation is AmnP 1
Si  :The fraction of real income spent on physical capital
Sb  :The fraction of real income spent on human capital58
S  :Nominal  exchange  rate defined  as the home  currency  price of the $ U.S.
X  :Real  export  growth  rate.
Y  :Real  GDP. In equations  (31)  to (33), Y represents  GDP growth  rate.
Data source:  International  Financial  Statistics  and World  Tables  (various  issues).59
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ANNEX TABLES73
Table Al:  Evidence  on African Smallholder  Supply ElasticiLieS
Product  and  Country  P&Mid  I  /o-mIlsIIj  ogrnEarcp  Ai/a
Cocoa:
Ghana  1930-1940  0.43-  Ady, 1949
1920.1939  0.17  Stenm,  1965
192n11946  0.15  Ibid.
1946-1962  0.32-0.87  Behnnun.1965
1946-1962  0.77-1.28  Ibid.
1947-1964.  0.71  Behnnan, 1968
Nigeria  1920-1945  1.29  Store. 1965
1947-1964  0.45  Behrman, 1968
1948-1967  0.20  Olayide. 1972
Ivory Coast  1947-1964  0.80  Behrnun, 1968
Cameroon  1947-1964  1.81  Ibid.
Coffee:  -_._.
Kenya: Estates  1946-1964  0.16  0.47  Maithh, 1969; Ford,
-Acreage  _______  ______  __  ____  ______  ______  1971
Keanya.  Smaltholder  1946-1964  0.20  0.56  Ibid.
Acreage  __,  - ._._:
Kenya: Estatea  Yield  1946-1964  0.66  1.71  Maitha, 1970; Ford.
____________________  1971
Kenya: Snallholder  1946-1964  0.64  1.01  Ibid.
Yield
Palm  Oil:  :
Nigeria  1950-1964  0.81  Diejonioh,  1972
1949-1963  0.41  Helleiner, 1966
1948-1967  0.22.0.26  Olayide,  1972
Eateam Nigeria  1949-1966  0.41-0.70  Oni, 1969a
Palm  Keemls:  _  '
Nigcria  |  _1950-1964  |  0.25  j|  Diejoniaoh,  1972
Cotton:
Nigeria  1950-1964  0.67  Diejonaoh,  1972
1948-1967  0.21-0.38  - Oni, 1969b
1948-1967  0.3  J  Olayide, 197274
|JWduci  and  Countr:  Period  S/ioN-rn Ilaatickty . .l.toug,  un  Riaslicky  AtMmor
TmnlAnin  1953-1969  2.44  Malna. 1971
I  Tl'd  occe  :  :_ 
__  __:_  __  _._
Malawi  1926.1960  0.4U  Dean, 1966
Rubbuer  _ -_:___________.___
Nilgrij  1948-1967  0,21  0.17-0.24  Olaylba, 1972
llnricot BDnua:
EUliopha  1953-1970  1.60  .oariig  at al.
CElIt:  Ethiopia  1957-1970  3.16  Ibid.
Pualms:  Ethiopia  1952-1970  0.72  I-lld
LeudIlc:  flhiopia  1953-1970  1.30  Ibid
Ediiopia  19S7-1970  0.61  Ibid
Sai:  OyBjid.(l: 
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Table A2: Ten Sub-Saharan  African Countries:  Cash-crop  Supply  Elasticities
Crop  Period  Author  Year  Short-run  Long-
Region - elasticity  run
(first  year) - elasticity
Cocoa:
Ghana  1947-1964  Behriman  (1968)  0.71*
Ghana  1949-1962  Bateman  (1965)  0.39  0.77
(old areas)
Ghana  1949-1962  Bateman  (1965)  0.42-0.51  1.28
(medium areas)
Ghana  1949-1962  Bateman  (1965)  0.61-0.87  1.06
(new  areas)_
Nigeria  1947-1964  Behrman  (1968)  0.71*
Nigeria  1947-1964  Behrman  (1968)  0.45*
Ivory  Coast  1947-1964  Behrman  (1968)  0.80*
Cameroon  1947-1964  Behram  (1968)  0.68*  1.81*
Coffee:  . ____
Kenya  1946-1964  Maitha  (1970)  0.64*  1.33*
Kenya (Estate)  1946-1964  Maitha  (1970)  0.66*  1.38*
Kenya (Smallholders)  1946-1964  Maitha  (1970)  0.64*  1.48*
Kenya  1946-1964  Ford  (1971)  _  1.07*
Kenya (Estates)  1946-1964  Ford  (1971)  1.  18*
Kenya  1946-1964  Ford  (1971)  1.55*
(Smallholders)  _  -
Africa  1947-1973  de Vries  (1975)  0.12*  0.44*
Cotton:
Nigeria  1948-1967  Oni  (1969b)  0.23-0.38  0.28
Nigeria  1950-1964  Diejomaoh  (1973)  0.67*  0.67*
Sudan  1951-1965  Medani  (1970)  0.39*  0.50*
Uganda  1922-1938  Frederick  (1969)  0.25*  0.25*76
Crop  Period  Autllor-  Year  Shoji-run  Long-
Region  elasticity  run
: fist  year)  elasticiJy
Uganda Buganda  1922-1938  Frederick  (1969)  0.67*-  0.67*-
_________  J.73*  0.73*
Uganda Buganda  1945-1966  Alibaruho  (1974)  0.50  0.63
Uganda  1945-1966  Al  ibaruho  (1974)  0.23  0.44
(Eastern Region)  _  _
Uganda  1945-1966  Alibaruho  (1974)  0.26  0.62
(Western  Region)  -
Uganda  1945-1966  Al  ibaruho  (1974)  0.02  0.07
(Northern Region)  ___
Groundnuts:
Nigeria  1  1948-1967  - Olayide  (1972)  0.24-0.79  0.24-
1 1  1  j  0.79
Palm  Kernels:  _  _  ____:
Nigeria  1949-1964  Oni  (1969a)  0.22-0.28  0.22-
:_  _ _  _  _ _  _ _  _  _ _  _ _  _ _  _  _ _  _ _ _  _ _ _  _ _ _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _ __  0  .2  8
Nigeria (Eastern)  1949-1964  Oni  (1969a)  0.280.39  0.28-
-_ _ _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  :-__  _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _ _  _  0  .3  9
Nigeria  1950-1964  Diejomaoh  (1973)  0.25*  0.25*
Palm Oil:  _  ______
Nigeria.  1950-1964  Diejomaob  (1973)  0.81*  0.81*
Nigeria  1949-1963  Helleiner  (1966)  0.41*  0.41*
Nigeria  1949-1964  Oni  (1969a)  0.29-0.35  0.29-
._  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  ._  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  0  .3  5
Nigeria (Eastern)  1949-1964  Oni  (1969a)  0.41*-  0.41-70*
:_ _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  -__  _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _  0  .7  0  *  -
Rubber:  - _
Liberia  1950-1972  Ghoshal  (1974)  0.14  0.22
Nigeria  1952-1972  Olayemi  (I975)  0.04  1.75*
and
Olayide  _  _  |77
Crop  Period  Author  Year  S/ionl-mn  Long-
Region  erasticity  run
|  . - . - |  __________  r.  .sQ  t year)  elasticiy
Sisal:  -
Tanzania  1945-1967  Gwyer  (1971)  0.06*  0.48*-
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  0 .7 6 "
Tobacco:
Malawi  1926-1960  Dean  (1966)  0.48*  0.48"
NLligeria  1945-1964  Adesimi  (1970)  0.60*  0.82  _
Notes:
An asterisk  indicates  that the cstinumte  is significantly  diffcmret  rrom zero at the 5 percent level of significance. -In  these
equations. acrca:eC  mther than quantity produced waS uscd as the dependent vaiable.
References For Annex Tables I and 2:
Stem,  R.  M.  "The De-terminants  or  Cocoa Supply in Wcst Africa," in Africa Primary  Products and
Intemational  Tradc, ed. I..  Steward  and H.W. Ord (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univcrsity  Prcss, 1965); Mcrril
J. Bateman, "Agrcgate  and Regional  Supply Functions for Ghanaian  Cocoa, 1946-1962,"  Journal of Farm
Economics 47,  No. 2 (1965):  384401;  S. Olajuwon Olayide, "Somc Estimatcs of Supply Elasticities of
Nigeria's Cash Crops," Journal or  Agricultural Economics 23,  No. 3 (1972): J.K.  Maitha, "Productivity
Responsc to Price:  A Case Study of Kenyan Coffce," Eastern Africa Economic Review 2, No. 2 (1970);
Derek J.  Ford,  "Long-Run Price Elasticities in die Supply of Kcnyan Coffecc: A Methodological Notc,"
Eastem Africa Economic Review, n.s.  3,  No. 1 (1971); T. James Gocrning, Akilu Afcwork and Abatc
Tcmcsgen, "The Rcsponsc of Ethiopian Farmers to Changcs in Product Prices," Forthcoming; Victor P.
Dicjomaoh, "Rural Development in Nigeria:  The Role of Fiscal Policy" (Paper prcsented to the Annual
Conferenec of  the Nigerian Economic Society, March 1972); Gerald K.  HdElciner,  Peasant Agriculture,
GovernmcnL,  and Economic Growth in Nigeria (Hoinewood, Ill:  Irwin,  1966); S.A.  Oni, "Production
Response in Nigerian Agriculture:  A  Case Study of  Palm Produce, 1949-1966," Nigerian Joumal of
Economic and Social Studies 11,  No. I  (1969a); S.A. Oni, "Economctric Analysis of Supply Response
among Nigerian Cotton Growers." Bulletin of Rural Economics and Sociology 4,  No. 2 (1969b); Edwin
Dean, The Supply  Responses of African  Farmncrs:  Thcory and Measuremcnt  in Lamawi  (Amsterdam: North
Holland,  1966); Jcre  R.  Bchrman, "Monopolistic Cocoa Pricing,"  American Joumal  of  Agricultural
Economies 58 (1968); Kighoma  A. Malima, "ThDeDterminants of Cotton Supply in Tanzania," Economic
Rcscarch Bureau Paper 71.4  (Dar es Salaarn: University of Dar cs Salaam, 1971).
Sourc:  Bond, 1983.78
Table A3: Estimates of Aggregate Supply Response in Agriculture:
Sub-Saharan Africa




Cowztiy  Period  Estimate  Period  Estinate
Ghana  1963-81  0.20 - 0.34*  1963-85  0.76*
Kenya  1963-81  0.10-  0.16*  1961-85  0.2
Cote d'lvoire  1963-81  0.13 - 0.13  1962-86  0.6
Liberia  1963-81  0.10-  0.11
Madagascar  1963-81  0.10--  0.14  1963-85  0.09 -0.17
Senegal  1963-81  0.54 - 0.54  1962-84  0.7  -1.0*
Twaaniia  1963-81  0.15-  0.15
Uganda  1963-81  0.05 - 0.07
Burkina  Faso  1963-81  0.22 - 0.24
Cameroon  1962-85  0.05 - 0.2
Camneroon  1975-85  0.8
Mali  1963-85  0.5 - 0.6*
Note: * Statistically significant at 10 percent level of significance.
Source:  Chhibber(1991).79
Table A4: Export Concentradon  and Export Share of Manufactures  and Fruits
and Vegetables  in SSA, 1987-88  (in percent)
Export Share  Export Share  Share  of  Share of
or  of Fruit  and  Principa4  TopTwo
Counuy  Year  ManufacturoAl  Vegetables!/  Export  Expona
Benin  1988  - - 47.8  82.6
BouwAn  198S  - - 76.7  81.3
Burkina Pao  1988  27.6  50.7
Burundi  1988  6.8  --  82.9  89.7
Cameroon  1987188  - - 45.7  59.8
Cape Verde  1988  - 24.2  27.7  51.8
Cent. Afr.Rep.  1988  - - 39.S  55.6
Chad  1988  - - 48.3  48.3
Comoroa  1988  - - 85.1  85.1
Congo  1988  - - 79.2  92.2
Cote d'lvoin:  1988  - 2.3  15.2  46.9
Equat. Guinea  1988  - - 54.5  92.7
Ethiopia  1988  - 1.2  57.8  72.3
Gabon  988  _-  - 62.0  75.5
Gambia  1987188  - 78.8  88.9
Ghana  1988  - - 52.5  71.6
Guinea  1988  :  - 82.1  82.3
GuiLea-Bimu  1988  - - 83.0  90.9
Kenya  1988  - 13.5  4.8  45.6
Lesotho  1988  64.0  - 64.0  81.0
Liberia  1988  - - 47.4  71.6
Madagascar  1988  - - 6.7  51.6
Malawi  1988  - 1.1  63.5  73.9
Mali  1988  - - 41.8  71.3
Mauritania  1988  - - 65.9  99.0
Mauritiu  1988  61.9  - 61.9  96.3
Mozambique  1988  - 1.8  42.8  68.5
Niger  1988  - - 73.7  84.6
Nigeria  1988  - - 85.5  89.2
Rwanda  1988  - - 1.0  96.1
Sao Tome  1988  9.1  - 88.2  90.7
Senegal  1988  - - 24.6  41.2
Seychelles  1988  - - W0.3  89.3
Sirrm  Leone  1987/88  - 32.3  50.1
Somalia  19S8  40.4  G.A  78.9
Sudan  19S8  - - 33.2  47.4
Swaziland  1988  5.2  27.4  .9  58.3
Tanznia  1988  19.5  - 25.9  46.1
Toga  1988  - - 49.7  66.8
Uganda  1987/S8  - 86.0  97.7
Zaire  1918  - - 55.3  67.8
Zambia  1988  - - 83.9  90.5
Zimbabwe  1988  20.8  - 20.8  31.1
:  / Excludes  cuon  lint and  fabrics.
W  Includes banas  (Cape Verde and Somalia).80
Table A5:  Major Depreciations  in SSA Countries  t1980-92)
Angola i  Dotlwan  Burundi  Cape Verde
Date  Depree.  Date  Deprew.  Date  Deprec.  Date  Depree.
91.3  100%  82.5  12%  83.11  29%  80.6  10%
84.7  13%  86.7  15%  82.6  9%
Data available  85.S  14%  88.2  10%  91.3  6%
till 91.6  X5.7  12%  89.11  13%
85.8  13%  91.8  18%
86.6  13%  92.6b/  10%
T'he  Gambia El  Ghan  a/  GuiJe  U  Guinea-Diss-ao  I
Date  Deprec.  Date  Deprec.  Date  Depre.  Date  Deprec.
81.2  6.42%  83.10  991%  86.1  1250%  83.12  100%
-1.6  4.74%  84.3  17%  86.5  16%  87.5  145%
B4.2  20.70%  84.8  10%  86.9  5%  87.12  15%
S6.1  54.10%  84.12  30%  87.1  80%  88.1  10%
cl  85.4  1%  87.4  5%  88.8  15%
87.3  6.30%  85.8  8%  87.R  3%  88.9  13%
89.9  6.5S%  85.10  5%  88.7  3%  89.2  11%
91 3  5.12%  86.1  50%  18.10  8%  89.3  90%
87.2  67%  £8.12  6%  89.6  8%
87.8  93%  89.9  5%  89.11  7%
87.9  7%  91.7  7%  90.7  9%
88.2  3%  fixed to US$  till S5.12  91.1  9%
88.7  6%  91.3  9%
88.8  14%  91.8  16%
89.2  12%
92.3  4%
rLxed  to USS tUi  cnd 87
Kenya  LesothD  Madagascar  Malawi
Date  Deprec.  Date  Deprec.  Date  Deprec.  Date  Depree.
81.2  6%  81.7  6%  CFA
till 82.3
81.9  18%  82.3  6%  82.4  15%
82.12  13%  83.10  7%  82.5  14%  83.9  12%
83.7  3%  84.7  20%  83.1  7%  84.1  4%
84.5  3%  84.10  13%  83.9  10%  85.4  17%
84.11  3%  85.7  15%  84.3  15%  85.8  4%
85.3  5%  85.8  27%  86.8  24%  86.2  7%
B5.8  10%  86.5  11%  87.2  6%  86.8  11%
86.2  5%  86.6  3%  87.6  63%  87.2  25%
86.6  3%  88.2  5%  91.1  13%  88.1  17%
87.1  7%  90.3  9%
87.1  4%  92.3  18%
89.9  5%  pegged to SDR till 84.1
pegged to SDR till 86.12B1
Mauritania  Ui  Maunridu  Mozaumbique  Nigeria
Data  Dbme.  Date  Depree.  Date  Depric.  Date  Duprec.
80A  34%  81.9  20%  82.6  4%  80.4  3%
84.2  30%  91.3  4%  87.1  413%  51.2  4%
84.3  3%  fixed to SDR  till 83.3  87.7  100%  81.6  5%
84.4  3%  58.1  12%  83.4  4%
84.5  3%  88.7  29%  85.3  5%
85.1  7%  N8.10  7%  85.9  S%
85.2  11%  89.1  4%  85.12  8%
85.9  4%  89.9  6%  86.6  15%
89.4  5%  89.11  15%  86.7  14%
90.3  5%  86.9  21%
90.9  8%  86.10  136%
90.12  7%  87.1  22%
91.4  25%  87.8  a  %
91.9  14%  87.10  5%
91.10  5%  85.7  9%
92.3  9%  88.10  7%








twand al/  Sao Tome  Sudanaa  Saazand
Date  Deprec.  Date  Deprec.  Date  Deprec.  Date  Deprec.
83.9  5%  87.7  124%  81.11  80%  81.-  6%
86.5  2%  88.7  26%  82.11  44%  82.3  6%
87.2  1%  89.2  19%  85.2  92%  83.1  6%
87.5  13%  89.10  8%  57.10  80%  84.7  19%
88.1  3%  89.11  10%  U4.10  12%
88.6  5%  90.5  8%-  84.12  6%
89.5  5%  91.5  19%  35.7  15%
90.11  66%  91.9  48%  85.9  18%
92.6  14%  85.11  7%
86.5  11%
gen  Leone afi  Somaia  afid  Tanzania  Uganda
Date  Deproe.  Date  Derc  . Date  De  rec.  Dt  err
83.7  94%  52.7  142%  82.3  11%  81.6  826%
85.2  135%  83.7  3%  83.6  26%  81.12  5%
86.6  147%  83.10  11%  84.6  3S%  82.5  5%
86.7  88%  84.9  48%  86.4  28%  82.6  4%
86.8  14%  85.1  35%  86.S  27%  82.12  6%
86.9  13%  85.5  7%  86.6  60%  83A  6%
88.3  24%  86.1  25%  f1  83.5  6%
88.43
87.2  13%  Ct  57.10  8%  83.6  13%
87.3  20%  87.6  47%  $7.11  9%  g/  19%
88.3  24%  88.6  80%  87.12  13%  83.11  13%
88.6  6%  58.8  23%  88.11  25%  84.2  15%
88.8  11%  89.2  13%  89.6  6%  84.8  24%
88.10  21%  89.3  10%  89.12  27%  84.1  10%
89.1  10%  89.5  29%  91.5  9%  84.11  17%
89.4  49%  89.6  10%  92.3  17%  85.1  48%
90.1  86%  89.8  11%  92.7  9%  S.1  41%
90.5  3S%  89.11  10%  85.12  322%
90.9  8%  89.12  37%  87.5  147%
91.7  23%  90.1  9%  85.7  19%
91.9  17%  90.2  8%  89.3  70%
91.10  12%  dams  till  B9.1  10%




Zaire if  Zambia  Zimbabwe
Date  Depree.  Date  Depree.  Date  Deprec.
80.2  42%  83.1  25S%  82.12  23%
81.6  67%  83.8  7%  84.7  8%
83.9  355%  83.12  7%  84.1  5  %
83.10  7%  84.1  7%  85.8  11%
84.1  5%  85.2  6%  88.10  5%
84.2  6%  85.1  219%  91.7  861%
84.3  7%  86.1  14%  91.8  13%
85.1  6%  86.2  10%  91,9  31%
85.3  7%  86.6  7%  Fixed to US$  till 53.06
86.7  7%  86.9  14%
87.1  19%  86.1  42%
87.2  8%  86.11  45%
87.3  12%  87.4  145%
87.4  14%  88.11  24%
-87.11  7%  89.7  50%
88.3  15%  89.1  10%
88.1  15%  59.12  16%
88.12  15%  90.t  10%
89.1  10%  90.6  10%
89.7  6%  90.7  9%
89.8  127%  91.2  10%
hj  92.2  29%









Depreiation  =  (exchangc  ratc(t)iexchange  rate(t-1)-l.
N.A.  =  Not Available.
The  exchange mre  is defined as local curmncy  per SDR (official  rate - end of the period).
a/ Countries in which the exchange rate  is defmed as Local Currency per USS (end of the period)
hb From  88.05 to S8.08 crawling peg (2.5 % avenge)
ct  From 86.02 to 86.05 crawling peg (20%. 9%, 7% and 3% depreciation)
di No devaluations,  one  revaluation  in 1981.3 (13%)
e/ From 86.03 to 86.11 crawling peg (6% avenge)
o From 86.07 to 87.4  crawling peg (5% average)
gI From 83.07 to 83.10  crawling peg (6% average)
h/  From 90.07 to 91.07 crawling peg C24%  average)
iV  Market rate  end of the  period
Sun  TI. Word  Bek BUD  darm'Table  A6:  Real  Effective  Exahange  Rate  in  BsA
- Cm  1980  19S  1990  991
Angola  100  ...  ...
Benin  100  80.99  81.65  81.05
Bolawana  100  89.39  90.12  86.39
Burkina  Paso  100  83.52  75.04  73.11
Bunmadi  100  135.27  77.08  77.53
Cameroon  100  99.72  114.05  108.90
Cape Verde  100  115.40  112.77  113.20
Cental Africs Rep.  100  93.81  95.06  89.60
Chad  100  89.90  67.33  63.12
Comorom  100  84.129  105.55  103.46
Congo  100  100.21  103.03  96.57
Cote dlvoire  100  73.61  9S.96  93.19
Djibouti  100  157.62  102.84  103.06
Equatoial Guine  100  ...
-IN  165.08  102.43  135.80
Ethiopia
Gabon  100  81.01  89.52  36.06
Gambia  TM  100  99.25  73.51  69.56
Ghana  100  53.21  21.12  21.89
Guinea  100  163.27  8.00  B.13
Guinea  B. Dimeu-  100  44.28  3.44  2.27
Bisaeauuu
rKenya  100  101.23  69.93  64.34
Lesotho  100  96.28  88.75  90.50
Liberia  100  182.91  235.97  263.84
Madagracar  100  92.72  52.41  46.11
Malawi  100  97.83  92.00  97.49
Mali  100  95.08  76.51  73.34
Manuritaiia  100  112.03  34.59  85.91
Mauritius  100  93.14  3A1A1  80.60
Mozamibique  100'  248.73  78.73  65.61
Niger  100  83.87  62.19  54.23
Nigeria  100  167.81  28.69  24.17
Rwanda  100  14B.02  121.55  92.S5
Sao Tome&  100  ...  ...
Prineipe
Senegal  100  103.19  94.78  37.95
Seychelles  100
Sierra Leone  100  192.26  82.00  32.24
Somalia  100  24.64  0.72  0.46
Sudan  100  100.60  218.16  369.55
Swaziland  100  91.58  35.71  84.93
Tanzania  100  207.49  37.24  39.80
Togo  100  81.38  78.74  75.17
Uganda  100  17.51  11.04  8.48
Zaire  100  4134  30.42  29.51
Zambia  100  84.81  74.75  66.10
Zimbabwe  100  92.50  62357  52.25
A  a  10  - - -. 0  104.14  77.:ro  . 1-  77  86
Sure:  Df  a  DBEDW,ed  nBkdua  haL84
Table A7: Per Capita Real Growth Raues
Annual Percentage
Country  1971-1991  1971-1980  1981-1991
Benin  -0.022  0.3  -0.35
Botswana  7.86  10.37  5.80
Ivory Cost  -2.05  2.27  -5.59
Cameroon  1.45  4.8  -1.3
Congo  2.55  3.7  1.59
Gabon  -0.33  2.4  -2.6
Ghana  1.4i  -2.2  -0.8
Gambia  0.94  1.2  0.7
Kenya  1.27  2.69  0.12
Lesotho  3.64  6.35  1.4
Madagascar  -2.60  -1.90  -3.1
Mali  0.74  2.2  -0.4
Mauritania  -1.04  -1.0  -1.0
Mauritius  4.61  3.7  5.27
Malawi  0.59  1.9  -0.5
Niger  -2.82  -1.36  -4.0
Nigeria  -0.47  0.9  -1.6
Rwanda  -0.36  1.8  -2.1
Senegal  -0.32  -0.8  0.06
Togo  -0.30  2.0  -2.27
Zaire  -2.5  -3.1  -1.9
Zambia  -2.16  -1.3  -2.8
Real GDP series code is 'NY  GDP MKTP KN'.  Growth rate =  A In (Per Lapita GDP),.
Source: World Bankl  data (BESD)85
Table A88;  Average Annual Inflation Rates
Country  1971-1991  1971-1980  1981-1991  1987-
199  1
Benin  5.8  9.9  2.5  1.6*
Botswana  10.9  11.4  10.6-  11.7
Ivory Cost  7.3  11.8  3.6  -0.6*
Cameroon  6.7  9.1  4.7  2.5*
Congo  5.4  8.8  2.5  -0.4*
Gabon  9.2  16.8  2.9  2.4*
Ghana  32.0  31.6  34.0  26.0*
Gambia  12.0  9.8  14.5  11.4*
Kenya  9.4  9.69  9.2  8.7*
Lesotho  11.7  10.6  12.6  13.7
Madagasar  13.3  9.8  16.0  15.0
Mali  6.4  9.1  4.2  1.8*
Mauritania  8.6  9.2  -8.1  6.2*
Mauritius  11.3  15.2  7.9  7.7*
Malawi  11.2  8.3  13.6  16.5
Niger  5.7  9.9  2.4  0.6*
Nigeria  14.9  13.7  15.8  25.4
Rwanda  8.1  12.4  4.7  5.2
Senegal  6.8  8.4  5.5  1.6*
Togo  6.1  7.6  4.8  2.3*
Zaire  39.0  29.8  47.7  60.0
Zambia  25.0  8.9  39.2  57.9
Intlation is defined as A In (GDP deflator),. The deflator series code is  TNY  GDP MKTP XN"
(1987=100).
Source: World Bank data (BESD)Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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